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I  
INTRODUCTION 
This article explores how ideas of size and scale function as categories of 
legal analysis when food provisioning is at stake. Debates about how food is 
produced and distributed are fundamentally debates about the structure of 
economic exchange and thus are also often debates about the legal rules that 
govern markets. At different moments in American legal thought, reformers 
have deployed arguments about the size of market enterprise and the scale of 
economic exchange in order to advocate for decentralized, democratic, and 
small-scale socioeconomic relations. And they have actively recruited law to 
advance their particular political-economic visions. This article asks how similar 
ideas of size and scale motivate actors today who wish to create alternative 
forms of capitalist food production and exchange—and why these ideas have 
had comparatively less engagement with law. 
Like other contributors to this symposium on contemporary legal thought, I 
follow Duncan Kennedy’s map in order to make sense of our contemporary 
legal moment—as well as to trace changes in the legal categories governing food 
markets over time. Kennedy distinguishes among three modes of legal thought 
that spread throughout the West and elsewhere between 1850 and 2000: 
classical legal thought, social legal thought, and contemporary legal thought.1 
Because I am interested in the intersection of law and food, I add a parallel map 
to Kennedy’s schema—namely, Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael’s 
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 1.  See generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, 
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
COHEN_FORMATTED_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2015  1:11 AM 
102 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:101 
studies of “food regimes.”2 Friedmann and McMichael describe three global 
shifts in the structure of agricultural production and trade that roughly parallel 
Kennedy’s historical periodization. By linking legal categories to categories of 
food production and distribution, I illustrate how the temporal changes that 
Friedmann and McMichael identify in food markets are made intelligible (even 
possible) by changes in modes of legal thought. 
But analyzing how law influences food is a one-sided frame. Also motivating 
this article is the more dynamic idea that law and food are both good to think 
with as contemporary objects and instruments of social and economic change. 
Here, briefly, is what I mean. As Kennedy describes it, each mode of legal 
thought is not a political ideology but rather a “consciousness” or “language.”3 
That is, modes of legal thought are temporally bounded epistemic perspectives 
that—in different ways in different historical periods—provide the vocabulary 
through which numerous kinds of regulations, judicial cases, social and 
economic programs, and justificatory arguments are articulated.4 Imprinted in 
Kennedy’s legal categories, then, are enduring cultural logics about the market, 
the state, and economic development. Claude Lévi-Strauss famously argued 
that food works in similar ways. “[T]he cooking of a society,” he wrote, “is a 
language in which it unconsciously translates its structure—or else resigns itself, 
still unconsciously, to revealing its contradictions.”5 That is, the production, 
provisioning, and cooking of food likewise encode basic human attitudes about 
the market, the state, law, technology, and sociocultural relations. As such, 
changes in the language of food—like changes in the language of law—reflect 
and require changes in these and other overlapping systems.6 Thus I begin this 
article by describing how different modes of legal thought shape food systems 
and enable their transformations. But I end by asking what contemporary food 
movements reveal about the possibilities and limits of contemporary law. 
Contemporary food movements have revived arguments about scale and 
size, and more specifically about the local and the small, as representations for 
ideas about desirable forms of market exchange—ideas that were once more 
familiar in law. In the early part of the period that Kennedy calls social legal 
thought, size and scale were salient legal categories of production and 
distribution linked to questions of political economy. In the face of mass 
industrialization, progressive legal reformers used these categories to demand 
decentralization and the diffusion of power in the market as much as in the 
 
 2.  See Harriet Friedmann & Philip McMichael, Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and 
Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present, 29 SOCIOLOGICA RURALIS 93 (1989). Friedmann 
and McMichael developed their food-regime analysis through a series of articles that, in turn, generated 
a great deal of secondary literature. For one example see the special issue, Symposium on Food Regime 
Analysis, 26 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 261 (2009). 
 3.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 23.  
 4.  See id.  
 5.  Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Culinary Triangle, in FOOD AND CULTURE: A READER 28, 35 
(Carole Counihan & Penny Van Esterik eds., 1997). 
 6.  My thanks to Harry West for this observation.  
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state. These demands for economic democracy have had a renaissance in 
food—but not in law. Today, progressive legal scholars are revitalizing efforts to 
democratize state institutions by expanding stakeholder participation in 
lawmaking and public life. But unlike their predecessors, contemporary legal 
scholars rarely suggest that decentralized publics should be empowered to 
regulate local economic conditions or that political citizenship requires a 
measure of market deconcentration to enable the democratic self-governance of 
economic life. 
To illustrate this point, the second part of this article examines democratic 
experimentalism—an influential decentralist legal reform movement that owes 
a great deal to the work of Charles Sabel. In the 1980s, Sabel argued extensively 
for decentralized, flexible, and relatively egalitarian forms of economic 
production—arguments that rural sociologists today draw upon as a model for 
agricultural reform.7 By contrast, for legal scholars, democratic experimentalism 
now stands for a different aim: namely, to import existing forms of flexible 
specialization from the market to restructure the institutions of the state. As we 
shall see, the political-economic aspirations limned by Sabel in his early work 
mostly vanished as democratic experimentalism became a project of 
contemporary legal reform. 
The third and final part of this article offers two examples of actors that are 
revitalizing arguments about smallholder production, local democracy, and 
market exchange: artisanal raw-milk cheese producers and fair trade activists. 
These movements share features in common with Sabel’s early work and with 
social-era ideas of political-economic deconcentration. For the most part, 
however, they have an uneasy and ambivalent relationship to contemporary 
law. I argue that for both analysts of law and food this gap is productive to think 
with. 
II 
FOOD REGIMES AND LEGAL THOUGHT 
This part retells Kennedy’s story of the globalization of law alongside 
Friedmann’s and McMichael’s story of the globalization of food. Although all of 
these scholars write from a transnational perspective, I focus my redescription 
on the United States because I am interested in what studying food movements 
illuminates about American law. In the amalgam that emerges, I pay particular 
attention to how different actors use law to challenge economic concentration 
and inequality in food systems, and how they use scale and size as progressive 
analytics to express ideas for market reform. 
 
 7.  See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: 
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).  
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A. The First Food Regime, Classical Legal Thought, and the Rise of the 
Family-Scale Commercial Farm 
Classical legal thought, which Kennedy dates between 1850 and 1914, 
governed the first food regime, which Friedmann and McMichael date between 
1870 and 1914.8 Its defining feature was a period of economic liberalization that 
Friedmann and McMichael call the first “international system” of food trade.9 
Classical jurists configured the market as a space of freedom, formal equality, 
and individual will that was governed by the private law of property and 
contract.10 They linked domestic free markets to the markets of other nation-
states via private international law, which, Kennedy argues, was conceived as 
“conceptually identical” to private domestic law.11 Classical legal thought thus 
facilitated the creation of world markets in food (which operated alongside 
older forms of colonial exchange).12 These new markets promoted competitive 
trade between European and independent settler states for commodities such as 
wheat and meat that were based, for the first time, on world prices linked to the 
sterling gold standard.13 
Intriguingly, the competitive advantage of settler states for commodities 
already produced in Europe depended on the rise of small-scale household 
agricultural production.14 In the United States in the late nineteenth century, the 
mechanization of harvesting machinery made family labor sufficient for a farm 
to specialize in wheat as a cash crop.15 Mechanization, combined with the wide 
availability of land and credit,16 placed household and “capitalist farms” (where 
landowners hired wage labor) in direct competition.17 Household farms—
motivated more by survival than profit—undercut their capitalist competitors 
by lowering their own standards of living and consumption.18 And when world 
prices dropped after 1885, many large American wheat farms split into 
household units.19 European countries, in turn, purposefully undermined 
domestic food security by importing cheap wheat and other food produced by 
family farms in settler states in order to subsidize the growth of their own 
industrial working class.20 Unpaid household labor in the United States and 
 
 8.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95; Kennedy, supra note 1, at 21. 
 9.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95–96 (emphasis original).  
 10.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
 11.  Id. at 34–35. 
 12.  See Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 96, 100. 
 13.  See id. at 99–100, 102; Harriet Friedmann, The Political Economy of Food: The Rise and Fall of 
the Postwar International Food Order, 88 AM. J. SOC. S248, S256–57 (Supp.1982).  
 14.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95, 100–01. 
 15.  Harriet Friedmann, World Market, State, and Family Farm: Social Bases of Household 
Production in the Era of Wage Labor, 20 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 545, 551 (1978). 
 16.  In 1862, Congress passed the Homestead Act making land grants available to individuals. 
Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976). 
 17.  Friedmann, supra note 15, at 551, 554, 564–71. 
 18.  Id. at 568.  
 19.  Id. at 574. 
 20.  See Harriet Friedmann, From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and 
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elsewhere thus “underwrote the developing [industrial] wage-relation and 
attendant growth of food markets.”21 
Small-scale family wheat production thus consolidated in U.S. agriculture 
around the same time that many other workers shifted from household to 
industrial wage labor—a shift that was also facilitated by legal reform.22 During 
the classical period, the law of the market separated from the law of the 
household as legal ideas such as self-ownership and the sale of labor power 
replaced an earlier legal regime based on “duties of obedience” and “rights to 
support” in the home.23 What emerged as a result of this new legal and social 
configuration was “classes of family farmers, which had never existed in 
history”: what Friedmann calls “the fully commercial farm based on family 
labor.”24 These family farmers could no longer survive based on subsistence 
household production. Rather, they became full-fledged market actors who 
increasingly specialized in single cash crops and employed early forms of 
industrialization—buying industrial inputs and selling raw materials for simple 
forms of industrial processing.25 And they depended upon export markets, 
international free trade, and world prices for their survival.26 
Small-scale American farmers’ increasing participation in world markets 
was accompanied by active, at times even explosive, participation in political 
life.27 Farmers organized not only around their class interests—protesting, for 
example, rising costs for industrial inputs and low world-market prices—but 
more broadly around questions of political economy.28 They leveled criticisms at 
American banking, monetary, taxation, and election policy, and in doing so 
expressed their general distrust of centralized public and private power.29 Grant 
McConnell thus describes this period, which peaked in the 1890s with Populist 
 
Emergence of Food Regimes, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 
227, 234–36 (Frederick H. Buttle & Philip McMichael eds., 2005). Indeed, wheat imports to Europe 
“almost sextupled between 1870 and 1929.” Friedmann, supra note 13, at S257. 
 21.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 95. I should add: the United States was one of 
several export settler states. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 237. 
 22.  New industries, such as mills and factories, had removed significant forms of economic 
production to a space outside the household. See, e.g., ALAN DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN 77, 131, 224 (1976); MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE 
CLASS 64–65 (1981); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 52–53 (2004). 
 23.  Janet Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy, Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2–4 
(2011); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 35. 
 24.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 235–36. 
 25.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 100, 102. 
 26.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 235–36. 
 27.  See GRANT MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 5 (1953). See also 
LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN 
AMERICA (1978); THOMAS H. GREER, AMERICAN SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENTS: THEIR PATTERN 
SINCE 1865 (1980) (chapter 3: “Farmers in Revolt”); JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A 
HISTORY OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE’S PARTY (1959). 
 28.  MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 5, 7. 
 29.  Id. at 5. Still, as Greer explains, the “Agrarian Crusade” did not aim to “overthrow the existing 
economic, social, or political system” but instead demanded reform in the interests of the “producing” 
classes against “the banking–manufacturing” industrial sector. GREER, supra note 27, at 61. 
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party politics, as one of “agrarian democracy,” a term he uses to capture the 
political dimensions of farmers’ aspirations for market reform.30 For example, 
the National Grange, which organized against monopolists and middlemen, 
called for “a proper equality, equity and fairness” as “the very essence of 
American independence.”31 These late-nineteenth-century agrarian demands—
articulated in the language of “equality and freedom”32—represent what 
Kennedy calls lay instantiations of classical legal thought.33 Will theory, 
Kennedy observes, was “highly manipulable.”34 Agrarians, for example, could 
claim that “bargains under capitalism did not represent ‘free will’” or that the 
state had impermissibly interfered in the free market to privilege the interests of 
industrial corporations and other large capitalists.35 Indeed, Lawrence Goodwyn 
argues that farmers of this era catalyzed “the largest democratic mass 
movement in American history.”36 The first food regime thus contained within it 
a powerful populist democratic critique of food (and other) markets articulated 
via the rhetorical tools of classical legal thought. 
B. The Second Food Regime, the Social, and Market Consolidation 
The social period, which Kennedy dates between 1900 and 1968, grew out of 
legal reforms designed to mitigate the inequalities and conflicts of classical legal 
thought as well as the rising social unrest articulated within it.37 Agrarian protest 
subsided after the turn of the century in part due to higher market prices that 
held steady until World War I.38 But when world prices for wheat fell by two-
thirds between 1925 and 1935, American family farmers were especially 
vulnerable.39 They responded by growing more crops (perhaps because of their 
household structure).40 And during the Great Depression, highly indebted, 
impoverished farmers and “unsalable wheat stocks coexisted with hungry 
people.”41 By the 1930s, farmers had organized into formidable coalitions to 
demand legal protection from domestic and international markets.42 Congress 
 
 30.  See MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 3–9. 
 31.  Id. at 6. 
 32.  Id. at 8. 
 33.  See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 27. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 27–28. 
 36.  See GOODWYN, supra note 27, at VII. 
 37.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 21, 37–38. 
 38.  MCCONNELL, supra note 27, at 11. 
 39.  Friedmann, supra note 15, at 546. 
 40.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 237. 
 41.  Id. at 238. 
 42.  See, e.g., GREER, supra note 27, at ch. 7 (“Agriculture’s Modern Front)”; Richard S. 
Kirkendall, The New Deal and Agriculture, in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL LEVEL 83, 85–96 (John 
Braeman et al. eds., 1975) (describing farm strikes and protests in the early 1930s). Organized farm 
lobbies had some success in the early 1920s securing legislative reform. For example, in 1921, the 
Packers and Stockyards Act, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159, prohibited packers from colluding in the purchase of 
livestock. A year later, the Capper–Volstead Act of 1922, ch. 57, 42 Stat. 388, limited antitrust liability 
for farmers who wished to collectively market their products. See GREER, supra note 27, at 224–25. 
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responded with preferential measures ushering in what Friedmann and 
McMichael call the second food regime—one based on state-managed 
agriculture rather than free trade.43 
Crucially, in the social period, law itself was reconfigured. Classical jurists 
understood law as a formal deductive technique; for them, the aim of legal 
reasoning was to enable individuals (and states) to “realize their wills, 
restrained only as necessary to permit others to do the same.”44 By contrast, 
social judges, administrators, and legislators reasoned instrumentally “from the 
social ‘is’ to the adaptive ought for law.”45 They eroded the classical distinction 
between the public and private and refashioned law into an expansive and 
purposive tool of intervention: “a regulatory mechanism that could and should 
facilitate the evolution of social life in accordance with ever greater perceived 
social interdependence at every level, from the family to the world of nations.”46 
The “social people,” as Kennedy calls them, also rejected the two exclusive 
categories of classical legal analysis: rights-bearing individuals and the nation-
state.47 They instead embraced a corporatist idea of society comprised of plural 
institutions “below and above the level of the state” as well as of organized 
groups “between the level of the individual and people” with access to state 
power.48 To that end, legal interventions were often designed to protect the 
aggregate interests of various economic groups—such as farmers and workers. 
Moreover, in social fashion, these interventions often did not grant new legal 
rights but rather created new legal and administrative welfarist regimes.49 
What this meant for American agriculture was a series of New Deal–era 
reforms designed in the class interests of (ultimately larger and certainly 
landed) farmers. State planners identified overproduction as the core problem 
driving down prices in agricultural markets.50 The Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933 aimed to raise farm incomes by compensating farmers who reduced the 
number of acres they devoted to wheat and other basic crops.51 To maintain 
target prices, the government purchased crops via the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC). The CCC, also created in 1933, issued loans at a 
 
 43.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 103.  
 44.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 26. 
 45.  Id. at 40. 
 46.  Id. at 22. 
 47.  See id. at 42. 
 48.  Id. at 40–42. 
 49.  See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 65–66 (explaining that “the general concept of a right” had “its 
historical low point in the 1930s (heyday of right and left versions of the social)”). 
 50.  Kirkendall, supra note 42, at 87. 
 51.   The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31. It was struck down 
by the Supreme Court in 1936 on the grounds that Congress was not empowered to tax agricultural 
processors and use the payments to raise farmer incomes. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
But the Act was mostly reissued with its core provisions for production controls intact (and upheld) as 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 
1281 (2012)). For details, see Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies in the New 
Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 342–44, 349–51 (1983).  
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specifically calculated rate that functioned as a minimum price (and thus 
effectively as a price subsidy); when market prices fell below this rate, the 
government took title to the commodities.52 The government rather quickly 
accumulated very large stocks of grain notwithstanding its efforts to encourage 
voluntary production controls.53 
The second food regime, which consolidated after World War II, was 
defined by the efforts of the United States to manage its oversupply of wheat.54 
Key to this regime was the newly established Bretton Woods international 
monetary system, designed to foster international interdependence and trade 
through stable exchange rates.55 Because this system tied world currencies to the 
U.S. dollar, the United States created an export subsidy when it decided to sell 
wheat abroad in negotiated prices in the currency of the importing nation 
(which typically lacked foreign exchange).56 It cleverly named this policy “food 
aid” and began exporting wheat first to postwar Europe,57 and then to 
developing countries via the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, more commonly known as Public Law 480.58 
Between 1956 and 1965, American food aid comprised a stunning one-third 
of world trade in wheat.59 Food aid enabled the United States to protect its own 
domestic producers while cultivating Cold War allies among former colonies—
many of which were agrarian societies self-sufficient in food grains but would 
soon come to rely on global markets for wheat.60 Third World governments 
embraced subsidized imports of grain to undercut their own domestic 
agricultural sectors in a drive towards industrialization.61 During the social 
period, the role of national food provisioning was thus as McMichael argues: 
“to subsidize, simultaneously, the First World social contract and Third World 
urban-industrial development.”62 But because American domestic subsidies, 
combined with massive subsidized exports, kept world prices low,63 small 
American farmers did not benefit nearly as much as large ones, and during the 
social period “the number of farmers had fallen to a tiny percentage of the 
 
 52.  Friedmann, supra note 13, at S258; Friedmann, supra note 24, at 239; see also Breimyer, supra 
note 51, at 346–47. 
 53.  Friedmann, supra note 13, at S258.  
 54.  For a detailed description, see id. 
 55.  See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 57–58. 
 56.  Friedmann, supra note 13, at S259, S262–63. 
 57.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 241; Friedman, supra note 13, at S260–61. 
 58.  Friedmann, supra note 13, at S261–62. See Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, Tit. 1, 68 Stat. 454, 455–57 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1691 
(2008)). By 1956, half of U.S. economic aid was food aid. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S262. 
 59.  More precisely, 31.8 percent between 1956 and 1960 and 35.6 percent between 1961 and 1965. 
Friedmann, supra note 13, at S264. 
 60.  Id. at S259; Friedmann, supra note 20, at 241–42. 
 61.  Friedmann, supra note 13, at S267–69; Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 104. 
 62.  Philip McMichael, Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime, in NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 272. 
 63.  Friedmann, supra note 13, at S266. 
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population because of the very success of the regime.”64 
The second food regime also witnessed intensive industrialization of 
agriculture and meat production in the United States as food became an 
increasingly manufactured product sold by corporate retail chains.65 
Industrialization helped to “renationalize” foods that the United States had 
previously imported from former colonies. For example, large food-processing 
corporations replaced sugar with chemical sweeteners and domestic corn 
products, and they replaced temperate and tropical oils with domestic soy.66 The 
postwar social period thus “framed the emergence of a number of giant 
agrofood capitals, which eventually became powerful actors, whose interests 
diverged from both farmers and national states.”67 Indeed, what began as a legal 
regime that included a measure of domestic protection for smaller family-scale 
farmers ended with the consolidation of large agribusiness corporations anxious 
to escape the regulatory controls of social law. 
C. Size and Scale as Representations of Decentralization and Democratic Self-
Government in Social Law 
In retrospect, America’s path towards large-scale industrialized agriculture 
is unsurprising. As Kennedy writes, the social after World War II was 
Keynesian.68 Keynesian policies of economic recovery required an economy of 
mass consumption and production and, in turn, state regulations (such as the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act) designed to stabilize mass markets. But, as others 
have argued, this path did not always appear inevitable, 69 and it was certainly 
not uncontested. In the 1930s, agrarians and other “decentralist intellectuals” 
attacked large-scale industrialization and big business as responsible for 
dispossessing small farmers, shopkeepers, and manufacturers, producing a 
propertyless class of workers and concentrating economic and political power.70 
Many of these decentralists represent what Kennedy describes as a particular 
progressive strand of the social preoccupied with “land reform, in the broadest 
sense, including the transformation of large into viable small properties, the 
agglomeration of minifundia into cooperatives, the abolition of tenure forms 
like sharecropping,” the creation of cooperative marketing boards and 
cooperative forms of agricultural finance.71 To that end, they criticized New 
 
 64.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 246. Friedmann explains that “[p]artly through success of support 
policies . . . the number of people working in agriculture fell by more than half between 1950 and 1972” 
from fifteen to five percent of the total population. Friedmann, supra note 13, at S274. But it was not 
just price supports that advantaged large farms: “industrialization of agriculture subordinated farmers 
to large agricultural input and food-processing firms.” Friedmann, supra note 24, at 246. 
 65.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 103; Friedmann, supra note 20, at 240. 
 66.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 109; Friedmann, supra note 20, at 244. 
 67.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 240. 
 68.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 57. 
 69.  See generally PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, and infra Part II. 
 70.  Edward S. Shapiro, Decentralist Intellectuals and the New Deal, 58 J. AM. HIST. 938, 939 (1972).  
 71.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 55. This decentralist defense of rural America and small business 
also included conservative voices concerned with, for example, preserving rural-oriented religious 
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Deal reforms such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act for intensifying 
dependency on public support rather than fostering economic self-sufficiency 
through, for example, widespread property ownership and tenancy reform for 
(often minority) sharecroppers and the rural poor.72 
During the social period, it was not only lay or fringe thinkers but elite 
reformers, such as Louis Brandeis and John Dewey, who expressed arguments 
about the dangers of industrial consolidation and state planning. As legal 
historian William Forbath puts it: 
What the Populists and labor radicals did for agrarian and working class movements, 
Progressive thinkers like Brandeis and John Dewey did for later middle-class and elite 
reformers: They interpreted the emergence of big business and corporate capitalism in 
terms of an inherited democratic constitutional tradition, and, in doing so, limned a 
vision for the future. 73 
Because Brandeis features on Kennedy’s map as an exemplary social jurist, 
it is worth pausing to examine a few of his more famous ideas.74 Like other 
decentralist reformers of his time, Brandeis argued that the problem with 
market concentration was political—not simply economic. “Business,” he 
explained, “may become as harmful to the community by excessive size, as by 
monopoly or the commonly recognized restraints of trade.”75 Big business 
requires a big state to regulate it—and both deprive citizens of opportunities for 
democratic participation at a scale meaningful for human development and self-
rule.76 Adolf Berle, Jr. summarized the point as follows: “There is [Brandeis’s] 
passionate belief in the doctrine that men are entitled to fulfill themselves; 
hence democracy; hence the desire for preservation of local experimentation; 
hence the fear of the overmastering big combination; hence also the fear of an 
overmastering federal government.”77 Thus even as Brandeis supported federal 
regulation of corporations, he cautioned that “[t]he federal government must 
 
morality and household structures. See Shapiro, supra note 70, at 940–41. Agrarians also split between 
those who favored racial equality and solidaristic class politics among poor rural blacks and whites and 
those who championed white supremacy. See PAUL K. CONKIN, THE SOUTHERN AGRARIANS 73, 100, 
117 (1988). 
 72.  Shapiro, supra note 70, at 942–44, 948, 951. These decentralists supported early New Deal 
measures like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Rural Electrification Administration. Id. at 944. 
Alternative proposals for agrarian reforms also included state ownership of services such as railways 
and grain elevators and strengthening farmers’ cooperatives. By contrast, the AAA’s regime of 
production controls “resolved the farm crisis without violating the constraints of the industrial capitalist 
economy” or “challenging the position of dominant class interests within agriculture.” Kenneth 
Finegold, From Agrarianism to Adjustment: The Political Origins of New Deal Agricultural Policy, 11 
POL. & SOC’Y 1, 7–11, 25–27 (1982).  
 73.  William E. Forbath, Why is this Rights Talk Different From All Other Rights Talk? Demoting 
the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1800 (1994).  
 74.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 47. 
 75.  Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 574 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 76.  STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF 
LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 307–08, 325–26 (1994). 
 77.  SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS: A STUDY IN THE 
INFLUENCE OF IDEAS 171 (1956) (quoting Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Way of an American, 25 SURV. 
GRAPHIC 597 (1936)).    
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not become too big just as corporations should not be permitted to become too 
big. You must remember that it is the littleness of man that limits the size of 
things we can undertake.”78 
For Brandeis, this attention to human scale meant that the question of 
American democracy could not be confined to the realm of the political. “[S]ide 
by side with political democracy,” he argued, “comes industrial democracy.”79 
And “democracy,” he explained further, “demands . . . ‘distributing power’: 
consumer power, economic power, political power and the power of human 
creative development”80—for example, forms of industrial organization that 
entitle workers to “not only a voice but a vote” and to meaningful participation 
in the management of their firms.81 He doubted the possibility of this sort of 
democratic self-governance unless states used their legislative power “to set a 
limit upon the size of corporate units” and thus to set a limit upon the 
“concentration of power.”82 To that end, Brandeis developed a social-era 
jurisprudence of market regulation that explicitly differentiated between the big 
and the small. 
As an apt example of this jurisprudence, consider Brandeis’s efforts to curb 
the power of large retail chains. In the early twentieth century, classical jurists 
struck down efforts by states to limit department stores and later chain stores 
by, for example, issuing graduated licenses fees or taxes based on how many 
stores a single corporation owned and the extent of these stores’ geographical 
reach.83 From a classical perspective, these sorts of legislative restrictions 
impermissibly interfered with the rights of all market actors to buy and sell on 
formally equal terms. According to Richard Schragger, the classical line of 
reasoning held steady in the judiciary throughout the 1920s, defeating anti-chain 
and anticorporate legislation (with Brandeis regularly dissenting).84 In 1931, 
however, the Supreme Court, in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 
upheld a state tax on chain stores precisely by distinguishing between the 
ownership and organization of chains versus independent stores.85 The Court 
supplied a number of social facts about the purchasing and management 
 
 78.  BASKERVILLE, supra note 76, at 311 (quoting Brandeis). 
 79.  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS 140–41 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935). 
 80.  BASKERVILLE, supra note 76, at 291 (quoting Brandeis). 
 81.  See BRANDEIS, supra note 79, at 83. 
 82.  Id. at 80. 
 83.  For a fascinating and detailed account, see Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1011, 1030–34 (2005). 
 84.  Id., at 1035–38. See, e.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 410–11 (1928) 
(Brandies, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are still intelligent, informed, just-minded, and civilized persons 
who believe that the . . . evils incident to the accelerating absorption of business by corporations 
outweigh the benefits thereby secured; and that the process of absorption should be retarded.”).  
 85.  State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537–38 (1931). The case “was initially 
hailed by some opponents of the Lochner Court as a victory for Brandeis and Holmes.” Schragger, 
supra note 83, at 1040. 
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practices of chains to conclude that the state had drawn a qualitative 
distinction—and one that was legitimate to advance social welfare.86 
This decision generated a good deal of debate. But the terrain of the debate 
was shifting. Whereas dissenting justices rejected (in classical form) the legal 
salience of a distinction between chains and independent stores, describing 
them instead as formally equivalent market actors,87 liberal New Dealers 
challenged the case on competing social welfarist and scalar grounds.88 Charles 
Beard, for example, argued that the kind of large-scale, scientific, centralized 
state planning of production and industry envisioned by liberal New Deal 
reformers required large-scale, standardized systems of distribution: hence 
chains. In Beard’s words, “Planned production without rationalized retailing is 
an impossibility.”89 And two years later, when litigants challenged a similar but 
more extensive antichain law before the Supreme Court, they attached Beard’s 
argument to their brief.90 
This time the Court struck down the tax with Brandeis (as well as Stone and 
Cardozo) dissenting.91 Significantly, in an impassioned (forty-page) dissent, 
Brandeis not only justified the state’s distinctions. He advocated for 
cooperatives as a viable economic alternative to retail chains (which, between 
1933 and 1936, increased over twofold92). “Americans seeking escape from 
corporate domination,” Brandeis wrote, 
have open to them under the Constitution another form of social and economic 
control. . .They may prefer the way of co-operation, which leads directly to the 
freedom and the equality of opportunity which the Fourteenth Amendment aims to 
secure. That way is clearly open. For the fundamental difference between the 
capitalistic [corporate] enterprise and the co-operative—between economic 
absolutism and industrial democracy—is one which has been commonly accepted by 
Legislatures and the courts as justifying discrimination in both regulation and 
taxation.93 
That is, Brandeis urged states to view not only difference in size but also 
difference in social organization as reasonable grounds for discrimination.94 And 
 
 86.  See Jackson, 283 U.S. at 534–35, 541–42. 
 87.  See id. at 544–45 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also Schragger, supra note 83, at 1039–40. 
 88.  Schragger, supra note 83, at 1042–44. 
 89.  Charles A. Beard, Planning and Chain Stores, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 30. 1932, at 66. 
 90.  See id. In Jackson, state legislation had distinguished between the ownership and management 
structure of chain stores versus independent stores, taxing chains based on the number stores under 
single ownership. Jackson, 283 U.S. at 530–33. In Liggett, state legislation also increased license fees 
based on the number of different counties that chain stores occupied—a scalar classification the 
majority found unreasonable. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 528–30, 533–34 (1933). 
 91.  Liggett, 288 U.S. at 532–35. 
 92.  LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN 
POSTWAR AMERICA 25 (2003). That said, cooperatives remained marginal in the United States; they 
never accounted for more than 1.5 percent of national retail sales. Id.  
 93.  Liggett, 288 U.S. at 579. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). See also BASKERVILLE, 
supra note 76, at 298–301. 
 94.  Brandeis wrote at length about the dangers of excessive size in Liggett—which “alone,” he 
argued, “gives to giant corporations a social significance not attached ordinarily to smaller units of 
private enterprise.”  Liggett, 288 U.S. at 565–66. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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he encouraged them to use their lawmaking power to favor economic activity 
organized through decentralized and democratic forms of control. 
At issue, then, in this case were competing ideals of the social good. 
Brandeis articulated a decentralist vision of political economy that he attempted 
to inscribe into law. But it lost—rather quickly—to a competing liberal ideology 
about the optimal size and scale of the market and the state. This competing 
ideology—based on the values of centralized, rationalized, and scientific 
management suggested by Beard above—counseled planners to stabilize the 
economy by working with, rather than against, big business and mass 
production.95 Thus, for example, the National Industrial Recovery Act limited 
antitrust liability precisely in order to enable firms to combine in ways that 
would facilitate industry-wide state planning.96 Although the Act was declared 
unconstitutional shortly after it was enacted,97 the working partnership it 
suggested between corporations and the state became the liberal governing 
consensus of the late New Deal (legitimated, for those on the left, by collective 
bargaining).98 By the end of 1930s, the New Deal coalition, especially the 
executive branch, “came to represent centralization, bureaucratization, and a 
new kind of urban liberalism sharply distinct from the older Progressivism.”99 
And public administrative agencies adopted the centralized and hierarchical 
organization of the mass corporation that they were tasked with facilitating and 
regulating.100 
I should make clear: this 1930s liberal embrace of bigness as a strategy of 
economic and political reform is related to, but not the same as, the political 
ideology of bigness that is more familiar today. The intellectual roots of this 
second defense of bigness, however, are also in the social period—most 
prominently in Ronald H. Coase’s 1937 The Nature of the Firm.101 Largely 
unread at the time,102 the article was an effort to explain why economic 
transactions are often not coordinated through the price signals of the market 
but rather through the hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of the firm. 
Coase argued that his answer—that using markets involves costs—allowed him 
“to treat scientifically the determinants of the size of the firm.”103 That is, he 
 
 95.  Schragger, supra note 83, at 1072. 
 96.  See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (repealed 1935).  
 97.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 98.  See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and 
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1423–27 (1993). Brandeis, I should add, was broadly 
supportive of unions. Still, he advocated for more cooperative relations made possible by applying 
principles of “diversity . . . decentralization, financial and territorial, with protective federations”—
measures he thought would help keep conflicts small and manageable. BASKERVILLE, supra note 76, at 
295–97. 
 99.  EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 38 (2000).  
 100.  See Michel C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 292–93 (1998).  
 101.  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 102.  See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 33, 33 (1988). 
 103.  Coase, supra note 101, at 394. 
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predicted that firms should “expand until the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same 
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of 
organising in another firm.”104 For Coase, how such costs are calculated and 
compared depends on complex temporal and social factors. “Changes like the 
telephone and the telegraph,” he explained, “which tend to reduce the cost of 
organising spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes which 
improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.”105 But 
the basic point was that firms should expand up and until there are “diminishing 
returns.”106 This idea would provide an intellectual foundation of our 
contemporary legal defense of “efficient monopolies” left unconstrained by a 
diminishing and deregulatory state.107 
In the 1930s and 1940s, however, Brandeis did not lose to Reagan-style 
neoliberalism and its policies of concentrated private wealth. Rather, he lost to 
Keynesian politics of World War II recovery, which established a regulated 
market economy, the near complete integration of industry and agriculture,108 
and a welfare state fueled by state interventions to support mass consumption.109 
Indeed, some Keynesians argued that mass consumption—enabled and 
required by mass production—would itself promote democratic and egalitarian 
values by distributing purchasing power as widely as possible.110 
In the following decades, this postwar vision of the social good came to 
embody development.111 The United States exported its own trajectory of mass 
production, distribution, and consumption in highly material form: in the case 
of food, first through food aid and then through “Green Revolution” 
technologies, a high-intensity approach to farming including seeds and 
pesticides produced by American industries.112 But for much of the world, this 
developmental trajectory would not be clear-cut. Indeed, in the early 1970s, the 
second food regime ended in crisis around the same time that Kennedy dates as 
the end of the social in law.113 
D. The Collapse of the Second Food Regime and the Rise of Contemporary 
Legal Thought 
Two world problems marked the collapse of the second food regime: that of 
 
 104.  Id. at 395. 
 105.  Id. at 397. 
 106.  Id. at 395.  
 107.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 22 (1976). 
 108.  McMichael, supra note 62, at 271. 
 109.  See COHEN, supra note 92. 
 110.   Id. at 55. Lizbeth Cohen describes the complex effects of a growing mass-consumption 
economy that redistributed access and opportunity and yet benefitted the middle class more than the 
working class, men more than women, and whites more than African Americans. 
 111.   Id. 
 112.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 243.  
 113.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 62 (dating the end of the social period as approximately 1968). 
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hunger and of free trade. As we shall see, both these problems and their 
solutions were articulated in the language of contemporary legal thought. 
Hunger first. In many developing economies, urbanization outpaced 
industrialization. As a result, the number of people who needed to purchase 
imported wheat outnumbered those who could afford to do so.114 In 1972 and 
1973, world markets for wheat based on American subsidies unraveled when 
the United States sold an enormous amount of grain to the Soviet Union as part 
of détente, depleting its supplies.115 As a result, the price of wheat more than 
tripled.116 Spikes in oil prices a year later increased cost of food even further, 
compelling developing countries dependent on imports to borrow money from 
private banks.117 “Suddenly,” Friedmann argues, “billions of people were 
defined as ‘food insecure.’”118 
In response, in 1974, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization called a 
World Food Summit. But when representatives of 135 nation-states gathered in 
Rome, they did not discuss the problems of markets, let alone the problems of 
public and private concentration in them, but rather the idea that people lacked 
food.119 The summit framed the solution to hunger in the language of rights—
namely, an “inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition”—and it 
created an International Undertaking on World Food Security.120 It is to this 
moment, Friedmann observes, that we can trace our current dominant 
discursive ideas of a right to food and food security.121 
At the same time, agribusiness corporations, which had vastly increased in 
power and transnational scale during the second food regime, desired greater 
trade liberalization. They “found themselves constrained by the mercantile 
trading rules and domestic subsidies of the [second food] regime.”122 Moreover, 
European countries had adopted protectionist policies and, with surpluses 
themselves, began to compete intensely with the United States for export 
markets.123 As competition increased, export subsidies could no longer 
 
 114.  Friedmann, supra note 13, at S272. 
 115.  Id. at S249–50, S272.  
 116.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 244. 
 117.  See id. at 244–45. 
 118.  Id. at 245. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  See Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, ¶¶ 1, 12 U.N. Doc. 
E/CONF. 65/20 (1974).  
 121.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 245. Of course, the right to food has earlier roots, appearing first 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. DOC. A/RES/217(III) at 
art. 25 (1948) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and 
Malnutrition], and then in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA 
Res. 2200, U.N. DOC. A/RES/21/2200 at art. 11 (Dec. 16, 1966). But its discursive reach expanded 
significantly with the 1974 Word Food Summit and then the 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food 
Security, which declared food security a universal right. World Food Summit, Rome, It., Nov. 13-17, 
1996, Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, 1, WFS 96/3 
(Nov. 13–17, 1996).  
 122.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 244. 
 123.  Id. at 243, 245–46. 
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masquerade as aid.124 In 1986, the United States, the Cairns Group, the 
European Community, and other wheat exporting countries began General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations to include agriculture 
within formal legal trade agreements—negotiations that culminated in 1994 
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture.125 
As agriculture was reconfigured as world trade, hunger was reframed as an 
increasingly privatized and internationalized problem. Early interpretations of 
the right to food within international organizations echoed ideas of the postwar 
social left. There were, for example, proposals for income redistribution to 
ensure that individual consumers could access food available via markets,126 as 
well as proposals for states to ensure adequate supplies of commercial food at 
“reasonable prices.”127 By the 1980s and 1990s, however, food security 
increasingly became a question of how individual households could increase 
their purchasing power by participating in markets, and how international 
markets could increase efficient supplies through free trade, technological 
innovation (including biotechnology), and comparative advantage.128 For 
example, advocating on behalf of agribusiness interests, the United States in 
WTO negotiations argued that food security was “best provided through a 
smooth-functioning world market.”129 This vision of food security recruits states 
and transnational legal institutions to establish and enforce legal rules enabling 
“free” markets, including strong protection for intellectual property rights such 
as patented seeds. 
Both the human right to food and the corporate right to property are 
intelligible—indeed predictable—in the language of contemporary legal 
thought. According to Kennedy, contemporary legal thought revives classical 
legal thought with its emphasis on rights and formal logic (legal categories that 
Kennedy suggests were at a “historical low point” in the 1930s version of the 
social130). This strand of contemporary legal thought, which Kennedy calls 
neoformalism, envisions “law as the guarantor of human and property rights 
and of intergovernmental order through the gradual extension of the rule of 
law, understood as judicial supremacy.”131 Its key unit of legal analysis, Kennedy 
 
 124.  Id. at 245. 
 125. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. Of course, despite the agreement, the United States and other 
countries in the global north have continued to provide commodity specific subsidies that mostly 
benefit large agribusiness. See Friedmann, supra note 20, at 246–47. 
 126.  Friedmann, supra note 20, at 248, 261 n.15 (describing the position of the New International 
Economic Order). 
 127.  See Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, supra note 120, at 
(g); see also Madeleine Fairbairn, Framing Resistance: International Food Regimes & the Roots of Food 
Sovereignty, in FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: RECONNECTING FOOD, NATURE & COMMUNITY 15, 22–23 
(Hannah Wittman et al. eds., 2010); Friedmann, supra note 20, at 248.  
 128.  Fairbairn, supra note, at 127, at 24–26; McMichael, supra note 62, at 276–81.  
 129.  McMichael, supra note 62, at 277 (citation omitted). 
 130.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 65–66. 
 131.  Id. at 22. 
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argues, is identity—or rather members of marginalized identity groups—not the 
organized groups or classes of the social period nor even the atomized 
individuals and nation-states of classical legal thought.132 Thus, for example, 
when the right to food is presented in collective terms, it is often couched as a 
matter of cultural survival.133 And multinational corporations themselves have 
adopted identity/rights discourse by transforming the ownership of property 
(such as patents and trademarks) “into a minoritarian identity and government 
regulation into the analog of discrimination by legislative majorities” (often by 
the legislatures in developing countries).134 
In addition to rights discourse, however, there is a second, and seemingly 
contradictory, trend in contemporary legal thought. Here, jurists and lawmakers 
think about law and legal technique not as the production of absolutist legal 
rules and rights but rather “as the pragmatic balancing of conflicting 
considerations.”135 The analytic roots of this approach—which Kennedy calls 
“conflicting considerations” or “policy analysis”—are in the social.136 But rather 
than purposefully shaping legal rules to advance a single or obviously desirable 
social end, this kind of policy analysis more modestly and pragmatically aims to 
balance among competing visions of the good, manage difference and 
uncertainty, and produce ad hoc compromises. In this mode, legal questions are 
subject to expert cost-benefit assessments, scientific studies, and public and 
private standard setting. Think, for example, of genetically modified foods. 
Against a minority of voices that called for an absolute ban on genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) as an unjust form of agribusiness, we have a legal 
regime governed by instrumental cost-benefit calculations measuring social risk 
(typically, environmental and health risks, such as antibiotic resistance and 
allergic reactions).137 Thus, on Kennedy’s map, two approaches to legal 
analysis—reconfigured elements of classical thought in the form of rights 
neoformalism and reconfigured elements of the social in the form of policy 
analysis—now coexist together.138 
 
 132.  Id. at 65–66. 
 133.  For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed jurisprudence that 
protects the collective property rights of indigenous people as a means of material and cultural survival 
including, fundamentally, producing and obtaining food. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. of H. R. (ser. C) No. 
146 ¶¶118, 120, 131, 132 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R.(ser. C) No. 125 ¶¶131, 135, 140, 146, 147, 154 
,155 (June 17, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 140(f), 148, 149, 153 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 134.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 67. 
 135.  Id. at 22. 
 136.  Id. at 22, 64.  
 137.  See generally CHAIA HELLER, FOOD, FARMS & SOLIDARITY: FRENCH FARMERS 
CHALLENGE INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS (2013). 
 138.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 63. 
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E. What Remains of the Social Today? 
Let me conclude this part by summarizing how the social does and does not 
persist on Kennedy’s map of contemporary legal thought. Kennedy identifies 
the presence of the social today in two distinct forms. The first form, as I have 
just suggested, is the transfiguration of the social into policy analysis, which is 
politically indeterminate. The second form is an independent or “left-over 
social” that when deployed “in the law of the market” is now discursively 
“almost always a progressive stance,” and is characteristically expressed in the 
language of human rights (such as the human right to food).139 
Mostly gone in elite legal discourse today is the social emphasis on size and 
scale that in the hands of early social-era progressive legal reformers, such as 
Brandies, fueled arguments for economic democracy. Consider, once more, the 
case of GMOs. In the late 1990s, transnational activists campaigned intensely to 
ban GMOs as a threat to smallholder agriculture. They argued that GMOs 
undercut small farmer autonomy by making farmers dependent on large 
agribusiness for seeds and pesticides and by forbidding them from saving and 
sharing seeds, thus destroying community-scale relationships and local 
knowledge networks.140 Against food security, small farmers’ movements 
demanded food sovereignty—a term purposefully chosen to highlight the 
political-economic dimensions of smallholder agricultural production and trade, 
namely the idea that food provisioning should happen at a scale that allows for 
a meaningful amount of self-determination, self-reliance, and democratic 
control.141 In this sense, food sovereignty evokes populist and early social-era 
agrarian arguments about economic self-governance as its own political good. 
Food sovereignty, however, is also a creature of its times; it draws on the 
rhetorical tools of contemporary legal thought. For example, the International 
Peasant’s Movement, La Via Campesina, which introduced the term in the 1996 
World Food Summit, describes food sovereignty  as “the right of peoples . . . to 
define their own food and agriculture systems.”142 That said, food sovereignty 
did not penetrate contemporary elite legal rights discourse. When rights claims 
enter GMO debates, the rights invoked tend to be consumers’ rights to 
information and choice, not producers’ rights to participatory self-
determination.143 Nor did food sovereignty penetrate elite legal policy analysis 
 
 139.  Id. at 64. 
 140.  See generally HELLER, supra note 137.  
 141.  See id. at 264–69, 271. 
 142.  See What is La Via Campesina?, LA VIA CAMPESINA (Feb. 9, 2011, 2:08 PM), 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44 (emphasis added). Food sovereignty 
also includes the right of peoples “to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in 
order to achieve sustainable development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be 
self reliant; [and] to restrict the dumping of products in their markets.” Main Issues: Food Sovereignty 
and Trade, LA VIA CAMPESINA (Sept. 2, 2003, 6:12 PM), http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-
issues-mainmenu-27/food-sovereignty-and-trade-mainmenu-38/396-peoples-food-sovereignty-wto-out-
of-agriculture. See also Michael Fakhri & Nathan Bellinger, The Intersection between Food Sovereignty 
and Law, 26 A.B.A. NAT. RES. & ENV’T 2 (2013). 
 143.  See generally Debra M. Strauss, The Role of Courts, Agencies, and Congress in GMOs: A 
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of GMOs, which remains focused on assessing and balancing risk to 
environmental and human health. Today, political fights about smallness and 
bigness—and with them normative arguments about smallholder production as 
a means to the ends of community, autonomy, and economic self-governance—
are not readily articulated by American legal elites. As I explore in the 
following part, current efforts by legal scholars to revive a progressive program 
of political decentralization are a telling case in point. 
II  
CONTEMPORARY PROGRESSIVE DECENTRALISTS, DEMOCRATIC 
EXPERIMENTALISM, AND THE BIGNESS OF NEOLIBERALISM 
In this part, I shift from an overarching legal-historical map of food 
production and distribution to a close examination of one contemporary 
decentralizing legal reform movement. I do so in order to illustrate how, among 
progressive “decentralist” legal academics today, ideas of size and scale are less 
relevant to reform markets than public sector institutions—an approach to 
social change that, as the following part argues, diverges markedly from the 
practices and aspirations of contemporary food activists. 
A. Contemporary Progressive Decentralist Movements in Law 
The last two decades of American legal thought have witnessed a 
proliferation of progressive legal reform projects that take scale seriously. 
These are projects dedicated to decentralizing political decisionmaking, 
lawmaking, and dispute resolution so that “the people themselves” can actively 
participate. Consider the growth of fields in law such as deliberative 
democracy,144 extrajudicial progressive constitutionalism,145 consensus-
building,146 new governance or democratic experimentalism,147 as well as 
prominent progressive defenses of federalism.148 
However, as Schragger aptly observes, progressive contemporary legal 
 
Multilateral Approach to Ensuring the Safety of the Food Supply Chain, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 267 (2012). 
Strauss extensively reviews U.S. litigation and state and federal regulation, which nearly always frame 
GMOs as a question of health and environmental safety and consumer choice. The exception that 
supports the rule is Dennis Kucinich’s failed attempts to pass the Genetically Engineered Technology 
Farmer Protection Act “to ensure fairness for farmers and ranchers in their dealings with biotech 
companies that sell genetically engineered seeds, plants, or animals” and to mitigate “abuses” that 
threaten farmers’ market access and the survival of family farms. See Genetically Engineered 
Technology Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 3555, 112th Cong. (2011).   
 144.  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. 
L.J. 347 (2004). 
 145.  For an overview, see Amy J. Cohen & Michal Alberstein, Progressive Constitutionalism and 
Alternative Movements in Law, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 1083 (2011). 
 146.  See, e.g., Lawrence E. Susskind, Consensus Building, Public Dispute Resolution, and Social 
Justice, 35 URB. L.J. 185 (2008). 
 147.  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100; William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming 
Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004). 
 148.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Supreme Court Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010).  
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scholars are typically interested in decentralization as projects of political 
democracy, defined narrowly to exclude economic life.149 This is the case, I 
should stress, even as some of these scholars have criticized the antidemocratic 
effects of large corporations. These criticisms are characteristically expressed as 
condemnation of legal rules, such as those announced in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, that treat corporations (and unions) analogously 
to individuals with First Amendment rights to influence political elections 
through spending.150 Daniel Tokaji, for example, argues that Citizens United 
undermines “an egalitarian vision of democracy.”151 But notice how he develops 
this claim: “Various types of federal and state laws help both individuals and 
corporations amass wealth. That is not to suggest that there is anything wrong 
with such laws. The problem. . .[is] that corporations [will] use their wealth in 
the political sphere, giving have-a-lots greater influence on election results.”152 
Legal arguments for retrenching corporate power in electoral politics are quite 
different from arguments about the conditions necessary to create democratic 
forms of economic, and hence, political life.153 
Indeed, Tokaji’s affirmation of legal rules that allow corporations to expand 
in size and power in the “economic sphere” represents, in Kennedy’s terms, the 
revival and reconfiguration of classical legal thought—a set of ideas, Kennedy 
explains, that when deployed today in the market represent a view of law as 
neoliberal ideology.154 As a principle to regulate markets, neoliberalism 
privileges a Coasian ideal of efficiency as well as the formal equality of all 
market actors, and it celebrates the individual entrepreneur by her capacity to 
innovate at an ever-expanding scale.155 It also aims to configure market 
exchange without jurisdictional or geographical limits or bounds. 
This is an evolution in law that scholars have traced quite clearly in the 
 
 149.  Schragger, supra note 83, at 1084–85.  
 150.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 151.  Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law: A Trans-
Border Comparison, 5. J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381, 382, 393 (2011).  
 152.  Id. at 389.  
 153.  See also William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991). In 
1991, Simon observed that “American legal culture tends to treat property ownership largely as a 
constraint on politics and not as a prerequisite to political participation,” and thus it neither defends 
minimum access to property for the poor nor capital constraints for the wealthy on political/citizenship 
grounds. Id. at 1354. Against what he called classic liberalism—a view of democracy that confines 
“norms of equality and participation . . .to a narrowly defined sphere of government”—Simon defended 
a social-republican view of democracy that conditions property ownership on community participation 
(such as in cooperatives) and that imposes restraints on accumulation in order to limit inequality among 
community members. Id. at 1335–36. 
 154.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 64. In his contribution to this issue, Christopher Tomlins describes 
neoliberalism as the unifying logic of our contemporary legal moment. Christopher Tomlins, The 
Presence and Absence of Legal Mind: A Comment on Duncan Kennedy’s Three Globalizations, 78 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 1–2, 2015 at 1. In this article, I view neoliberalism as the overwhelmingly 
dominant American approach to market regulation, but with Kennedy, not as hegemonic of all of 
contemporary legal thought.  
 155.  Think, in colloquial terms, of Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butts who told farmers to 
“get big, or get out.”  See Michael Carlson, Obituary: Earl Butz, THE GUARDIAN, February 4, 2008. 
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context of antitrust—where, in the words of Barak Orbach, “size is not a 
concern.”156 Orbach is describing our now dominant interpretations of antitrust 
law, espoused most famously by Robert Bork and Richard Posner, in an effort 
“to dispel any remaining anti-bigness shadows from American competition 
laws” associated with social-era jurists like Brandeis.157 In the 1970s and 1980s, 
Chicago school economists and legal scholars argued that the public interest is 
best served, not via a market comprised of many competitive smaller or 
medium-sized firms, but rather via a regulatory regime that allows market-
dominant firms to expand, provided that this configuration maximizes the total 
surplus value generated across an economy.158 Indeed, from this perspective, if 
prices are competitive, firms may consolidate until only three remain.159 This 
efficiency argument functions today as a powerful defense of bigness even if, as 
Orbach argues, the neoliberal legal position does not have any a priori 
commitments to size. 
Or, to put the point another way, progressive decentralist legal scholars tend 
not to directly challenge the neoliberal consensus on market size or scale as a 
primary organizing principle for economic activity, even as they argue for 
enhanced forms of democratic participation and self-determination in legal and 
political institutions. (Although several such scholars, to be sure, would 
condition genuine political participation on secondary forms of economic 
redistribution such as public provisioning of housing, childcare, welfare, and a 
minimum wage.) 
One of the most complex and puzzling examples of this tendency among 
progressive decentralist legal scholars is democratic experimentalism—a legal 
reform project pioneered by Charles Sabel, Michael Dorf, and William Simon, 
among others.160 In Kennedy’s terms, democratic experimentalists desire a 
reconstructed version of the social: they wish to institutionalize conflicting-
considerations policy analysis outside of traditional and hierarchical legal 
forums. Indeed, for them, a basic problem in American law is that we have 
inherited a centralized legal regime from the New Deal and postwar social 
period in which rules are enacted from above to create inflexible administrative 
bureaucracies. In place of command and control administration, these scholars 
aim to revitalize political decentralization and local forms of democratic 
cooperation. Lawmakers, they argue, should enact general rather than specific 
rules. And “stakeholders,” rather than passively following these rules, should 
participate actively and collaboratively in elaborating, revising, and 
implementing them.161 
 
 156.  See Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 608 (2012). 
 157.  Id. at 608; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
(1978); see also POSNER, supra note 107. 
 158.  See generally, COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011) (ch. 
3: “The Corporate Takeover of the Market”).  
 159.  Id. at 60. 
 160.  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100; Simon, supra note 147.  
 161.  For a summary of some of the core commitments of democratic experimentalism, see Amy J. 
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Schragger reads democratic experimentalism like other contemporary 
decentralizing trends in law. He writes: 
There are legal scholars who urge us to recover the reformist aspects of 
decentralization. A number of local government scholars, for example, have sought to 
reinvigorate local government as a constitutional ideal . . . . At the same time, Charles 
Sabel and Michael Dorf have encouraged a “Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism,” in which decentralized government plays a significant role in 
generating innovative and testable policy programs, a “new form of government” that 
enables “citizens . . . to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual 
circumstances.”  But these proposals rarely speak in terms of economic 
deconcentration, and mostly ignore the connections between political and economic 
decentralization.162 
Schragger’s argument—that democratic experimentalism mostly ignores the 
connections between political and economic decentralization—is perhaps 
understandable on the face of Dorf and Sabel’s 200-plus-page text.163 But here is 
what makes democratic experimentalism both so puzzling and complex: it is 
hard to think of a contemporary progressive decentralist legal scholar with a 
more developed and nuanced defense of smallholder democracy than Sabel. In 
the remainder of this part, I set forth some of his early arguments in order to 
illustrate the kinds of political-economic and scalar claims that progressive 
decentralist legal scholars today rarely express. In the following part, I illustrate 
how food activists inherited some of Sabel’s early ideas even as these ideas 
mostly disappeared from decentralist movements in law. 
B. The Second Industrial Divide 
In 1984, Sabel, along with the labor economist Michael Piore, published The 
Second Industrial Divide—an influential and controversial book that traces the 
rise and decline of mass manufacturing between approximately 1870 and 1960 
in the United States (and in several comparative cases) over three historical 
periods that correspond roughly to both Kennedy’s as well as Friedmann and 
McMichael’s maps.164 Strikingly, Piore and Sabel argued that the late-
nineteenth-century shift from craft to mass production did not reflect the 
economic superiority of the mass industrial model as much as extant political 
interests and market power.165 In place of mass production, Piore and Sabel 
 
Cohen, Producing Publics: Dewey, Democratic Experimentalism, and the Idea of Communication, 9 
CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 143 (2012); Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on 
Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357 (2010); Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, 
Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008).  
 162.  Schragger, supra note 83, 1084–85 (emphasis added) (quoting Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100). 
 163.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100. 
 164.  PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7. Like Kennedy and Friedmann and McMichael, Piore and Sabel 
write from a perspective that is both transnational and comparative; but, again, I focus my redescription 
on the United States. 
 165.  Id. at 37–38. They write further:  
[T]he technological possibilities that are realized depend on the distribution of power and 
wealth: those who control the resources and the returns from investment choose from among 
the available technologies the one most favorable to their interests. . . . [H]istory suggests 
that—under different circumstances—the craft sectors could have played a stronger role in 
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would resuscitate a (mechanized) version of craft production—in their words 
“flexible specialization”—alongside a political philosophy of democracy based 
on nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century smallholder and yeoman ideals.166 
The arguments about flexible specialization that Piore and Sabel developed 
in The Second Industrial Divide present a vision of smallholder democracy that 
is tailored to contemporary times. These arguments also remain a core 
justification for democratic experimentalism today, albeit in a rather different 
way.167 For both of these reasons, it is worth fleshing out the book’s central 
claims. 
At the core of the book is a distinction between mass and craft production. 
In mass production, semiskilled workers use special-purpose and product-
specific machines to produce standardized goods.168 Because workers are 
subordinated to machines, they are easily governed by top-down mechanisms of 
control: management promulgates narrow and inflexible rules to define work 
tasks and entitlements.169 By contrast, in craft production, skilled workers use 
general multipurpose equipment to produce a more diverse family of small-
batch goods.170 Because human skill remains key to productivity, labor and 
management relations are more collaborative and include criteria of worker 
merit and self-determination.171 
These two visions of economic and social organization, Piore and Sabel 
argued, require different kinds of markets and hence different kinds of public 
and private regulation in order to exist. In mass production, economies of scale 
and narrow workplace rules create both efficiencies and rigidities. Expensive 
special-purpose tools lower production costs and increase the volume of 
standardized goods. But they also limit the ability of mass producers to adjust to 
decline or variation in demand—both because fixed costs are high and because 
neither the tools nor the rigidly organized workers can be easily reprogrammed 
to new tasks.172 As such, mass production requires macroeconomic rules and 
policies that generate stable mass markets in which consumption is matched to 
production.173 (This was precisely the logic that in agriculture influenced the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act and then decades of American food aid policy.) 
By contrast, when markets are saturated, uncertain, or unstable, craft 
 
economic development. 
Id.  
 166.  Id. at 18.  
 167.  See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. nos. 1–2, 2015 at 61; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and 
Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de Búrca & 
Joanne Scott eds., 2006).  
 168.  PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 4. 
 169.  Id. at 113–15. 
 170.  Id. at 5. 
 171.  Id. at 115–20, 278. 
 172.  Id. at 49–51. 
 173.  Id. at ch. 4 (“Stabilizing the Economy”). 
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production or “flexible specialization” offers more microlevel self-correcting 
mechanisms and efficiencies.174 Workers can reorganize to produce new product 
lines using general tools unconstrained by large capital costs. And they do not 
need to rely on the state to sustain markets for their goods. The regulatory 
problem they confront, however, is that firms may respond to instability and 
consumer variation through price competition achieved by sweating labor and 
cheapening materials, and hence undermine the conditions for innovation.175 
Flexible specialization therefore requires “the creation, through politics” of 
state- and community-based regulatory institutions that exempt wage and price 
reduction from competition.176 Such institutions and rules would, in turn, enable 
firms to compete “through the innovation of products and processes” and, to 
that end, also collaborate by sharing information, skills, and technology.177 Thus, 
Piore and Sabel argued, had “craft production prevailed, we might today think 
of manufacturing firms as linked to particular communities.”178 
Craft production, however, lost out due to a series of political and 
regulatory choices that helped to entrench mass production over time. In the 
United States, the shift from craft to mass production—our first industrial 
divide—happened under a regime of laissez-faire governance characteristic of 
classical legal thought. Between the 1870s and 1920s, large corporations were 
left mostly unconstrained by state regulation to coordinate supply and 
demand.179 But because the economy had become “extremely sensitive to the 
level of consumer purchasing power,” self-stabilization through firm-level 
regulation alone proved insufficient to surmount the shocks of the Great 
Depression and the declining wages that followed it.180 Indeed, Piore and Sabel 
submitted that “the fundamental cause” of the Depression “was the structural 
fragility of the economy that was associated with the rise of the mass-production 
corporation.”181 Sustaining a mass-production economy, they argued, requires 
macroeconomic regulation of economic activity to coordinate supply and 
demand—hence, the Keynesian policies of the New Deal and postwar social 
period that took industrial, domestic, and international form. For example, 
Keynesian policy measures included labor and minimum-wage legislation and 
especially “pattern bargaining,” a form of collective bargaining that linked 
 
 174.  Id. at 17. 
 175.  Id. at 263. 
 176.  Id. at 17, 30, 270. 
 177.  Id. at 30, 283, 298. 
 178.  Id. at 6.  
 179.  Id. at 15 and ch. 3 (“The Corporation”). To manage problems such as overproduction and 
instability in levels of consumer demand, corporations deployed strategies such as “segmentation,” that 
is, retaining a stable demand for themselves and leaving more risky variable demand for small 
producers. They also stabilized their own markets by requiring large customers to enter into long-term 
futures contracts. In addition, they developed various forms of vertical integration that enabled them to 
vary the amounts of inventory they put on the market; for example, sugar refineries developed 
networks of warehouses to manage price fluctuations in raw sugar. Id. at 56–59. 
 180.  Id. at 77. 
 181.  Id. at 75. 
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wages to the cost of living and increases in national productivity.182 They also 
included increased social welfare and military spending,183 as well as the Bretton 
Woods System that established predictable exchange rates tied to the U.S. 
dollar.184 These regulatory structures helped maintain a stable mass economy 
until the 1970s when the world witnessed a crisis of mass production. The causes 
were numerous and complex, but what was clear, Piore and Sabel insisted, was 
that the postwar regulatory system had failed to prevent a crisis within mass 
industrial capitalism185—thus our second industrial divide and another moment 
of political choice.186 
C. Flexible Specialization and Smallholder Democracy 
In response to the second industrial divide, Piore and Sabel outlined a vision 
for the future that would revive “an older conception of the polity” by 
combining flexible specialization with “yeoman democracy.”187 In their words: 
We need to examine the ideas and industrial communities of the nineteenth-century 
American artisans, and of their heirs among the Populists, the twentieth-century craft 
workers, and even some modern unions. The small-holder democracy that these 
people have practiced and defended shows a way to reconcile individual autonomy . . . 
with the restricted competition that is essential for flexible specialization.188 
The contemporary smallholder democracy that Piore and Sabel envisioned 
would take root in “industrial districts” comprised of small and medium firms 
linked together via “an ethos of interdependence among producers in the same 
market” and by the use of fair ways to compete.189 These forms of collaboration 
and competition would be maintained, in turn, by familial and community ties 
and institutions as well as by regional public social welfare systems that supply, 
for example, finance, vocational training, and marketing information.190 
Of course, for Piore and Sabel, as for other decentralist reformers, scale and 
size did not represent their own ends. Rather, they stood for particular social 
and economic relations—here, ones that allow workers sufficient autonomy, 
security, and egalitarian opportunity to respond nimbly and creatively to 
market demand. On this view, flexible specialization could be achieved by very 
large corporations comprised of federated smaller work groups that operate 
 
 182.  Id. at 79–82. 
 183.  Id. at 89–91. 
 184.  Id. at 107–11. 
 185.  They included: rises in the prices of oil and wheat; the collapse of fixed exchange rates; 
deregulatory measures that undercut the postwar system of wage determination; and the saturation of 
domestic markets for consumer durables and new variation in consumer demand. Id. at ch. 7 (“The 
Mass-Production Economy in Crisis”). 
 186.  Id. at 252. 
 187.  Id. at 18, 305.  
 188.  Id. at 18.  
 189.  Id. at 265–67, 272. 
 190.  Id. at 273–76. “Among the ironies of the resurgence of craft production,” they argued, “is that 
its deployment of modern technology depends on its reinvigoration of affiliations that are associated 
with the preindustrial past.” Id. at 275. 
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effectively along craft lines.191 At the same time, however, Piore and Sabel 
offered an intrinsic, even moral, case for a different organization of work in 
contemporary life—one that depends on “solidarity and communitarianism.”192 
As Sabel wrote in an earlier book about industrial districts in Italy: 
If you had thought so long about Rousseau’s artisan clockmakers at Neuchatel or 
Marx’s idea of labour as joyful, self-creative association that you had begun to doubt 
their possibility, then you might, watching these craftsmen at work, forgive yourself 
the sudden conviction that something more utopian than the present factory system is 
practical after all.193 
Piore and Sabel thus layered arguments about the potential efficiencies of 
decentralized flexible production onto arguments about the kinds of political, 
economic, and scalar arrangements that enable workers to live meaningful, 
creative, and self-determined lives. 
To that end, Piore and Sabel did not rely simply on firm-level and 
technological change to determine relations between capital and labor, let alone 
transform societies. To the contrary, they made clear that flexible specialization 
could unfold on the ground in more or less egalitarian ways.194 Ensuring more 
egalitarian economic and social relations, they suggested, requires not only a 
reorganization of labor and adversarial shop-floor control but also a state that is 
“responsible for creating conditions conducive to a republic of small holders.”195 
This is a state—and especially reinvigorated forms of local and regional 
government—that “must guarantee that market transactions do not 
permanently advantage one group of traders—and thus undermine the basis of 
the balance of wealth and power that makes possible a community of 
producers.”196 In such a political regime, property would not be used “to the 
maximum advantage of its possessor” but rather “held in trust for the 
community—its use . . . subordinated to the latter’s maintenance.”197 In other 
words, Piore and Sabel sketched a future where flexible specialization would 
both enable and require a particular progressive vision of political economy—
one that embodies democratic community, a multiplicity of producers, 
collective individualism, and a redistribution of property rights. This vision has 
identifiable antecedents in the periods of classical and social legal thought but is 
 
 191.  Id. at 267–68. Although large corporations can “serve as the organizational frame of flexible 
production,” Piore and Sabel also argued that this model “is not the most promising one for the United 
States.” Id. at 300. 
 192.  Id. at 278. 
 193.  CHARLES F. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS 220 (1982).  
 194.  PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 307. In their words:  
We have seen examples of flexible specialization in which property was widely distributed and 
authority regarding investments broadly shared; but we have also seen examples in which the 
workers had autonomy at the work place, yet the managers (ultimately responsible to private 
investors) held control over the fundamental economic decisions. 
Id. 
 195.  Id. at 305. 
 196.  Id. at 301, 305 (emphasis added).  
 197.  Id. at 305. For a richly argued account of this view of private property, see Simon, supra note 
153.  
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without many prominent defenders in contemporary American law.198 
D. Democratic Experimentalism and Contemporary Law 
So what happened to this vision of political economy in democratic 
experimentalism? In the decade following the publication of A Second 
Industrial Divide, Sabel translated his work on the economy and the firm into a 
decentralist legal reform project that coalesced around his 1998 A Constitution 
of Democratic Experimentalism coauthored with Michael Dorf (and referenced 
by Schragger above199). Although flexible specialization anchored the article’s 
ideas, Sabel’s emphasis had shifted. He and Piore concluded A Second 
Industrial Divide by proposing that the state could “coordinate the necessary 
rearrangement of relations among firms, and between labor and capital—and 
thereby redefine the relation between government and economy.”200 He and 
Dorf opened A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism by offering the 
new firm as a model for state reform.201 
To that end, Dorf and Sabel began with a narrative familiar from A Second 
Industrial Divide. The rise of large-scale mass production, they explained, 
generated centralized and hierarchical regulatory institutions that both 
mirrored and served to regulate the corporate form.202 This partnership between 
the state and the market held steady until the mid-1970s when the global 
economy encountered a crisis of standardized mass production. Firms, 
especially in Japan, surmounted the crisis by transforming themselves into 
federations of flexible work groups engaged in learning by monitoring, 
benchmarking, continuous adjustment, root-cause analyses, and just-in-time 
production.203 In the 1990s, Dorf and Sabel continued, American firms adopted 
similar techniques—even though they were not subject to similar state 
regulatory restrictions, such as lifetime employment, thought to have enabled 
flexible specialization in Japan.204 Dorf and Sabel viewed this “rapid diffusion” 
of flexible specialization across diverse contexts optimistically. It suggests, they 
argued, that actors in numerous and very different “settings are sure enough of 
the limitations of organizations premised on bounded rationality and mass 
production” to reorganize themselves along more open, decentralized lines.205 
Significantly, Dorf and Sabel proposed that the techniques deployed in 
 
 198.  Cf. James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 
YALE L.J. 340 (2007) (describing how, unlike in the United States, policies designed to support market 
access for producers continue to influence the capitalist legal systems in continental European countries 
such as Germany and France). 
 199.  Schragger, supra note 83, at 1084–85. 
 200.  PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 306. 
 201.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100, at 267. 
 202.  Id. at 292. 
 203.  Id. at 286–88, 297–306. 
 204.  Id. at 297, 305–08. This meant that firms could not lower costs via layoffs but rather had 
institutional incentives to retrain their workers. Id. See also PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 161; 
Simon, supra note 153, at 1402.  
 205.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100, at 312. 
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these new firms—what they call the “pragmatist disciplines”—can themselves 
slowly transform social relations “in the course of [their] operation.”206 In their 
words: 
learning by monitoring “politicizes” the economy by introducing a kind of workplace 
democracy. Group deliberation in benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error 
detection become central to all decisions . . . In obliging disputatious yet collaborative 
evaluation of how diverse potential products will be used in life, of conflicting ways of 
making them, and of the contrasting measures of corporate and individual 
performance, learning by monitoring strips from economic decisonmaking the veiling 
technicity of maximization of profits given prices, and thus distributes authority from 
the “rulers” to the “people.”207 
Dorf and Sabel thus redescribed the flexible specialized firm as a pragmatic 
practice and set of deliberative techniques that establish a model for workplace 
democracy—a model that they extrapolated apart from social and political 
conditions and variability (and, it would appear, apart from unegalitarian 
instantiations of flexible specialization on the ground208). They then applied this 
pragmatist model to argue for the transformation of “political institutions in the 
form of democratic experimentalism.”209 These include regulatory and public 
service institutions (for example, family support services, community policing, 
military procurement, and nuclear and environmental regulations) as well as 
branches of government (courts, Congress, and administrative agencies). The 
article, in turn, spawned a range of similar proposals in public education,210 
prisons,211 child welfare services,212 drug courts,213 and public land and water 
management.214 Democratic experimentalism had thus become a program of 
public-sector reform. 
I cannot speculate why Sabel, as he constructed democratic 
experimentalism, pursued his own deep insights about the mutual conditioning 
of the economy and polity in a mostly one-sided way—so that the new 
corporation became a model to decentralize the state while the role of the state 
in decentralizing the market receded from the project. But for this issue on 
 
 206.  Id. at 308.  
 207.  Id. at 313. 
 208.  Labor law scholars argue that flexibility norms have mostly eroded, not advanced, worker 
security, welfare, and solidarity while enhancing employer control. See Kerry Rittich, Making Natural 
Markets: Flexibility as Labour Market Truth, 65 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 323 (2014). 
 209.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 100, at 313 (emphasis added). 
 210.  Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 261 (2004); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely 
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 183 (2003).  
 211.  Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). 
 212.  Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the 
Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523 (2009). 
 213.  Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts & Emergent Experimentalist 
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000). 
 214.  Bradley Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 
21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2001). 
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contemporary legal thought, I can observe the ways in which democratic 
experimentalism exemplifies its era. As Kennedy argues, the social-era model 
of society as comprised of different organized groups and of the state as 
coordinating their coexistence has—in the contemporary legal moment—
disappeared.215 With it has also mostly disappeared the normative idea that law 
should regulate markets to protect multiple kinds of producers from “unfair” 
competition—or, in Sabel’s terms, the idea that the state should mediate among 
different configurations of wealth and power in order to facilitate a community 
of producers—rather than, for example, to ensure maximally efficient prices or 
nondiscrimination on the basis of protected identities. In this way, we can 
understand democratic experimentalism, as Schragger does, as one of several 
contemporary progressive decentralist movements that invests its primary legal 
and political energy into democratizing the institutions not of the market but of 
the state.216 
At the same time, however, the “ideal of yeoman democracy”—the legacy 
that Sabel argued is mostly likely to motivate the transformation of the 
American economy217—continues to persist as cultural and political capital 
among social conservatives and liberals.218 Indeed, a recent poll reports that a 
significant majority of Americans prefer smaller businesses to larger ones.219 
Moreover, this smallholder ideal is perhaps nowhere more visible than in 
agriculture itself. To this day, the American state provides extension services, 
tax benefits, subsidized credit, and debt relief to farmers, in ways that still offer 
some preferential treatment for smaller farms.220 These efforts have not 
prevented massive consolidation in food production and distribution, but they 
 
 215.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 67. 
 216.  Within the democratic experimentalist project, Sabel has remained interested in the scalar 
regulation of the economy but this interest is in the background of the work. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel 
& William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 69 
(2011) (suggesting that conventional regulatory tools such as cost-benefit analysis and cap-and-trade 
miss the ways in which “publicly subsidized technical assistance may be needed to induce small- and 
medium-sized producers to adopt socially desirable practices and to protect them from the competitive 
disadvantages that they might suffer vis-à-vis larger producers as a result of regulations requiring 
technologically complex responses”).  
 217.  PIORE & SABEL, supra note 7, at 306. 
 218.  An important point, but one beyond the scope of this article, is the uneasy alliance—I would 
venture scalar tensions—between American neoliberalism, with its commitments to efficiency and 
market rationality in all spheres of life, and neoconservatism, with its moral valorization of family and 
religious loyalty that tends to honor the small business, family-scale enterprise, and local commerce. On 
the contradictions and powerful overlaps of this alliance, see Wendy Brown, American Nightmare: 
Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization, 34 POL. THEORY 690, 698 (2006). 
 219.  PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL, PUBLIC AFFAIRS PULSE SURVEY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON 
BUSINESS IN AN ELECTION YEAR 17–18 (2012). 
 220.  See, e.g., SUSAN SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING, AND SUSTAINABILITY 14, 41 (2010) 
(discussing sections in federal farm bills and in the bankruptcy code that provide greater financial 
assistance to small farmers); see also Steven C. Bahls, Preservation of Family Farms—the Way Ahead, 
45 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1997) (surveying state laws that restrict corporate ownership of agricultural 
land as well as measures in federal tax law, bankruptcy law, and farm programs designed to protect the 
interests of small farmers).  
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have led some contemporary legal scholars to argue for the obliteration of the 
remaining traces of scale-sensitive protection for small farms and firms in 
American law.221 
In the final part of this article, I identify new kinds of yeoman ideals 
influencing alternative food movements today. These movements present 
themselves as antidotes to mass industrialized food by seeking to relocalize, 
respatialize, and re-embed food in particular geographical spaces and moral and 
social relations. The normative commitments of these movements include 
particular restrictions on size, scale, and social organization—commitments that 
help to produce their alternative politics and uneasy relation to contemporary 
law. 
IV 
A CHALLENGE FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT?: ARTISANAL 
CHEESE AND FAIR TRADE TOWNS 
To return to Friedmann and McMichael’s historical narrative, our current 
food regime is characterized by the intensive consolidation and corporatization 
of food production and distribution.222 Indeed, nearly sixty percent of food and 
beverages sold in the United States is controlled by “the ten largest U.S.-based 
multinational corporations.”223 Moreover, policy analysts “predict that it is not 
unrealistic to imagine future global markets in which the sale of food is 
controlled by four to five global firms with a handful of regional and national 
companies.”224 This economic concentration was made possible in part by the 
relaxed antitrust law and enforcement of the late 1980s and 1990s that enabled a 
series of mergers and acquisitions among large processors and retailers.225 It was 
also facilitated by the rise of flexible-specialization technologies in large 
corporations that were not subjected to the restricted competition, social 
protections, and collaborative regulatory infrastructure that Piore and Sabel 
initially envisioned.226 
 
 221.  See, e.g., Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and 
Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 376, 431 (1997). Among their most pressing concerns are insufficient 
standards to regulate (often minority) labor on smaller farms.  
 222.  Friedmann calls the present moment a corporate–environmental food regime. Friedmann, 
supra note 24, at 251. McMichael calls it the corporate food regime. McMichael, supra note 62, at 273.  
 223.  Thomas A. Lyson, Civic Agriculture and the North American Food System, in REMAKING THE 
NORTH AMERICAN FOOD SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY 19, 21 (Clare Hinrichs & 
Thomas A. Lyson eds., 2007). 
 224.  OLI BROWN WITH CHRISTINA SANDER, SUPERMARKET BUYING POWER: GLOBAL SUPPLY 
CHAINS AND SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 1 (2007). 
 225.  Lyson, supra note 223, at 20–22; see also Ronald W. Cotterill, Continuing Concentration in 
Food Industries Globally: Strategic Challenges to an Unstable Status Quo, 49 FOOD MKTG POL’Y CTR. 
RES. REP. 1, 1 (1999); Ronald W. Cotterill, Mergers & Concentration in Food Retailing: Implications for 
Performance & Merger Policy, 2 FOOD MKTG POL’Y CTR. RES. REP. 1, 1 (1989). 
 226.  As a case in point, consider retail chains—widely considered the most powerful and 
oligopolistic actors in food systems today. In the 1970s and 1980s, American and European retailers 
developed highly responsive and flexible tracking systems that they used to calibrate increasingly 
casualized labor practices quite precisely to fluctuations in consumer demand. See Amy J. Cohen, 
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But Friedmann and McMichael, like Kennedy, suggest that our current 
moment does not embody a single totalizing logic as much as contradiction, 
contestation, and opposing forces.227 For them, the hegemony of corporate 
industrial food (including its relentless integration of alternative food trends 
such as organic228) now sits alongside new forms of counter-hegemonic 
resistance. In McMichael’s words, “the corporate food regime embodies the 
tensions between a trajectory of ‘world agriculture’ and cultural survival, 
expressed in the politics of ‘food sovereignty.’”229 
Indeed, despite corporate intensification over food-supply chains—or 
perhaps because of this intensification—it is hard to think of another arena of 
everyday life where people as regularly express opposition to large-scale 
industrialization and aspirations for alternative forms of capitalist production 
and exchange. As Julie Guthman writes, 
As an activist movement, the alternative-food movement is one of the most successful 
of our day if you consider the numbers of people who identify with it by shopping at 
alternative-food institutions, attending events, contributing money, and providing 
countless hours to gardening projects, farm-to-school programs and “hanging out” 
with food.230 
Although it is challenging to get precise data, food scholars have widely 
observed the recent uptick in farmers’ markets, community-supported 
agriculture, community gardens, consumer cooperatives, alternative food stores, 
and place-based and values-based labels.231 To be sure, these developments 
encompass a range of social values including health, wellness, and 
environmental protection. But they also increasingly express a core principle of 
food sovereignty: namely, that small producers and consumers should make 
democratic decisions about food provisioning in particular social and 
geographical spaces.232 
 
Supermarkets in India: Struggles over the Organization of Agricultural Markets and Food Supply 
Chains, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 24–29 (2013).  
 227.  See Philip McMichael, A Food Regime Genealogy, 36 J. PEASANT STUD. 139, 148–54 (2009) 
(debating whether there is a third distinctive food regime that has fully consolidated). 
 228.  See, e.g., JULIE GUTHMAN, AGRARIAN DREAMS: THE PARADOX OF ORGANIC FARMING IN 
CALIFORNIA 51–53 (2004) (describing the production of organic food on small and large farms 
disconnected from social movement activism and fair labor practices). 
 229.  McMichael, supra note 62, at 274. 
 230.  JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM 
143 (2011). 
 231.  See, e.g., Lyson, supra note 225, at 28 (reporting, among other trends, a thirty-five percent 
increase between 1992 and 2002 of the number of farms selling directly to the public). As of 2007, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture reports 4385 farmers’ markets and 12,549 farms selling via community 
supported agriculture (CSA) arrangements. See Farmers Markets and Local Food Marketing, U.S 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/farmersmarkets/facts.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); 
Community Supported Agriculture, U.S DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/ 
csa/csa.shtml (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). See also Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, June 10, 2010, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/food-
movement-rising/. 
 232.  See Philip McMichael, Food Sovereignty in Movement: Addressing the Triple Crisis, in FOOD 
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 127, at 168. 
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Why food accomplishes this kind of expressive social work is an intriguing 
question. Perhaps it is because people’s relationships to food, unlike their 
relationships to the production and consumption of durable goods, are 
organized around continuous and repetitive practices: purchasing, cooking, 
serving, eating, if not also producing, processing, and trading it. “‘Foodways,’” 
as Jakob Klein, Johan Pottier, and Harry West observe, “therefore are 
profoundly entangled with ‘lifeways.’”233 The repetitive labor of food, in other 
words, is constitutive of self and social relations and, as such, “motivates 
action.”234 It is also the case that “[e]ven today, more than half of the world’s 
population derives a living from food-related work.”235 Understood from this 
perspective, food is a potent symbolic and material practice of everyday life and 
thus a powerful tool to reimagine relations of community and economy. 
In this final part, I offer two examples of such American reimagining: 
artisanal cheese production and scalar debates within the U.S. fair trade 
movement. My first example describes food producers themselves who combine 
the pursuit of exchange value with the pursuit of other kinds of values, 
including small-scale craft production as its own ideal of local development. My 
second example is briefer; it touches on how fair trade activists aim to create 
particular ethical relations of market exchange that preserve market access for a 
multiplicity of local producers (where localism itself is a contested economic 
space). Some of these actors go much further in their defense of smallholder 
production than Sabel. For them, smallness—including particular kinds of 
structural limits to expanding in size—is valued as its own means to achieving 
the ends of democratic self-government, local development, and economic 
citizenship, even when these ends are not directly tethered to expanding 
efficiency and productivity. To that end, the actors I describe embody some of 
Brandeis’s smallholder ideals. But they are not engaged in similar efforts to 
create a national jurisprudential and legislative architecture of economic 
decentralization. Rather than a politics aimed at creating state institutions that 
foster and coordinate widespread and macrolevel change,236 artisanal cheese 
makers and fair trade activists offer a politics grounded primarily (indeed, 
purposefully) in the possibility of transformative social and economic relations 
in particular places and networks of exchange—albeit ideally in relations that 
can be replicated in many other spaces.237 It is a politics of the local and the 
small that, for the most part, is only indirectly expressed in the language of 
 
 233.  Jakob A. Klein, Johan Pottier & Harry G. West, New Directions in the Anthropology of Food, 
in 2 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 299, 302 (Richard Fardon et al. eds., 2012). 
 234.  BRAD WEISS, THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE HAYA LIVED WORLD 128 (1996). 
 235.  Klein et al., supra note 233, at 302. 
 236.  Cf. Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 CONTEMP. 
PRAGMATISM 35, 41–42 (2012) (criticizing industrial districts for the absence of federated governance 
structures that connect localities and foster learning among them).  
 237.  Crisinta Grasseni suggests that the metaphor used among many radical food activists “is that 
of the strawberry field . . . to indicate a mission to proliferate while maintaining small scale, expanding 
into neighboring terrains.” Cristina Grasseni, Reinventing Milk and Cheese in Italy, between Re-
localizaiton and Co-production, GASTRONOMICA (forthcoming 2015). 
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contemporary law. 
A. Artisanal Cheese and Taste of Place 
Today, there are more than 450 enterprises that handcraft cheese in the 
United States—a number that has more than doubled since 2000.238 Many of 
these artisanal producers use raw milk to make their cheeses.239 As Piore and 
Sabel would predict, artisanal versus industrial cheese production embody very 
different forms of knowledge and skill, as well as processes of variability and 
uncertainty. Briefly described, the aim of industrial cheese making is to 
maximize standardization and predictability.240 Milk pooled from multiple 
sources is pasteurized and homogenized (that is, made consistent in protein and 
fat content). Because pasteurization eradicates both pathogenic and beneficial 
microbes, industrial milk is then reseeded with commercially produced bacteria 
necessary for cheese production.241 By contrast, “artisan cheese makers 
embrace—even celebrate—some degree of variability.”242 Indeed, the microbes 
that cultivate artisanal cheese may include mold spores from cave walls or straw 
mats where the cheese is left to age.243 Thus Harry West explains that the 
process of artisanal cheese production fluctuates with changes in raw materials 
seasonally, daily, and sometimes even “from morning milking to afternoon 
milking,”244 and hence requires, in Piore and Sabel’s terms, highly flexible and 
self-regulating labor. 
For many artisanal raw-milk cheese makers, it is the know-how and self-
mastery necessary to manage this variability that fuels their alternative agrifood 
politics. To ensure both safety and quality, artisan producers must maintain 
sufficient control over the entire process. Cleaning, for example, is highly 
skilled labor because it enables cheese makers to help beneficial microbes 
outcompete any pathogens that might be present.245 “If you want to properly 
clean a certain surface,” one cheese maker explains, “you need so much 
percentage of soap and so many minutes—if you approach it like that . . . it’s 
doing something necessary and productive.”246 As such, many artisanal cheese 
 
 238.  HEATHER PAXSON, THE LIFE OF CHEESE: CRAFTING FOOD AND VALUE IN AMERICA 3 
(2013). See also Heather Paxson, Locating Value in Artisan Cheese: Reverse Engineering Terroir for 
New-World Landscapes, 112 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 444, 445 (2010).  
 239.  Heather Paxson, Post-Pasteurian Cultures: The Microbiopolitics of Raw-Milk Cheese in the 
United States, 23 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 15, 41 n.1 (2008) (reporting that 85 percent of artisanal 
cheese makers in Vermont, 65 percent in New England, and 50 percent nationwide work with raw 
milk). 
 240.  Harry G. West, Thinking Like A Cheese: Towards an Ecological Understanding of the 
Reproduction of Knowledge in Contemporary Artisan Cheese Making, in UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL 
TRANSMISSION IN ANTHROPOLOGY: A CRITICAL SYNTHESIS 320, 321 (Roy Ellen et al. eds., 2013). 
 241.  Id.  
 242.  Id. at 322. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id.  
 245.  Paxson, supra note 239, at 33. 
 246.  Id. at 33. 
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makers argue that “raw-milk cheese is a value-added food that . . . cannot be 
successfully absorbed by industry giants; at a scale larger than artisan, a farmer 
would have many people working for him or her, thereby losing direct control 
over production quality.”247 Likewise, some argue that a clean, safe milk supply 
requires pastured animals raised on hay rather than on fermented corn (silage), 
similarly limiting the possibility of industrial cooptation.248 Thus precisely what 
makes raw-milk cheese of political significance to small producers is likely what 
would make it appear marginal to legal reformers with aspirations for 
macrolevel policy change: namely, that artisanal control means that there are 
structural limits to scaling up its production. 
To be clear, these cheese makers know well that restricting raw milk and 
cheese production to a small artisanal scale does not itself ensure safety or 
quality. Rather, size and scale stand for particular economic and social relations 
(as well as commitments to quality) that they must actively nurture and 
protect.249 Thus, although artisanal cheese makers regularly link their arguments 
about small-scale production to instrumental concerns about risk, more for 
them is at stake. As anthropologist Heather Paxson observes, 
When producers . . . argue that raw milk production should be restricted to small-scale 
operations, they want to secure a symbolic connection between raw milk and small 
farmers . . . as a means of sustaining their farms and revitalizing rural communities and 
economies. They want to see raw-milk cheese become a cornerstone of a “civic 
agriculture.”250 
Civic agriculture is a term coined by the influential rural sociologist Thomas 
Lyson to advocate for decentralized practices of food production linked to local 
development and community identity.251 Lyson, in turn, modeled it in part on 
Piore and Sabel’s proposals for industrial reform. “The civic agriculture 
perspective,” Lyson explains, “favors smaller, well-integrated firms/farms 
cooperating with each other . . . . The ideal form is the production district, 
similar to the industrial district notion mentioned earlier (Piore and Sabel 
1984). Producers share information and combine forces to market their 
products.”252 As Paxson observes, many artisanal cheese makers likewise 
describe small-scale raw-milk cheese production as a practice of economic and 
social citizenship grounded in place-based development and mutual aid.253 
 
 247.  Id. at 32. 
 248.  Id. at 40. 
 249.  PAXSON, supra note 238, at 60–62. 
 250.  Paxson, supra note 239, at 35.  
 251.  See THOMAS A. LYSON, CIVIC AGRICULTURE: RECONNECTING FARM, FOOD, AND 
COMMUNITY 1–2 (2004). 
 252.  Lyson, supra note 225, at 25. Lyson writes further, “The state supports these economic 
ventures by ensuring that all firms have access to the same resources such as information, labor, and 
infrastructure.” See also LYSON, supra note 251, at 75. Other contemporary food scholars also use The 
Second Industrial Divide as inspiration for alterative models of agriculture. See, e.g., Amy Guptill & 
Rick Welsh, Is Relationship Marketing an Alternative to the Corporatization of Organics? A Case Study 
of OFARM, in FOOD AND THE MID-LEVEL FARM: RENEWING AN AGRICULTURE OF THE MIDDLE 
55, 61–64 (Thomas A Lyson et al eds., 2008) (describing a “second agricultural divide”). 
 253.  Paxson, supra note 238. 
COHEN_FORMATTED_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2015  1:11 AM 
Nos. 1 & 2 2015]   THE LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY FOOD 135 
One of the ways the idea of civic agriculture is expressed among cheese 
makers is through conversations about terroir or “taste of place”254—where 
“place,” Paxson clarifies, refers “to the material conditions of a locale—soil, 
topography, and microclimate—and also to the cultural know-how behind 
agricultural products that help constitute ‘place’ as a locus of shared custom and 
affective belonging.”255 Terroir has a long history in French law influenced by 
social-era ideas of corporatism and regionalism. And, as we shall see, it lacks a 
meaningful analogue in contemporary American law. 
Briefly described, in the first decade of the twentieth century, French law 
granted legal status to wine “that had an association with a region that was 
‘local, loyal, and constant.’”256 In 1935, legislation designed to “protect terroir” 
was revised to include quality-based criteria for production, and the regime 
grew to include cheese, honey, and agricultural products such as olive oil and 
potatoes.257 Significantly, only groups of producers—not individuals or 
corporations—could apply for collective property designations known as 
appellation d’origine controlee (AOC).258 As Amy Trubek and Sarah Bowen 
explain, “from its very inception, the AOC system has rewarded the collective 
agency of a group of producers.”259 In this way, Trubek makes clear, “the rules 
and regulations of the AOC system guarantee the possibility of local control, 
thus keeping the knowledge and the power in the hands of the growers, the 
vintners, and others in each agricultural region.”260 Today, the AOC system also 
requires producer groups to respect “the essential principles of ‘representivity’ 
and ‘democracy.’”261 
To be sure, as a legal and cultural category, terroir can generate struggles 
and inequalities as different groups and actors vie to benefit from collective 
property designations.262 But it has also provided the basis for formidable 
 
 254.  AMY B. TRUBEK, THE TASTE OF PLACE: A CULTURAL JOURNEY INTO TERROIR (2008). 
 255.  Paxson, supra note 238, at 444. 
 256.  TRUBEK, supra note 254, at 26. 
 257.  Id. at 27–29.  
 258.  Id. at 26, 28–29. 
 259.  TRUBEK, supra note 254, at 29; Amy B. Trubek & Sarah Bowen, Creating the Taste of Place in 
the United States: Can We Learn from the French?, 73 GEOJOUNRAL 23, 25 (2008). See also Sarah 
Bowen & Ted Mutersbaugh, Local or Localized? Exploring the Contributions of Franco-Mediterranean 
Agrifood Theory to Alternative Food Research, AGRIC. HUM. VALUES (2013) (explaining that the 
European “regions with the greatest concentration of [geographical indicators] are frequently 
characterized by strong, long-standing collective producer organizations”). 
 260.  TRUBEK, supra note 254, at 31. 
 261.  Trubek & Bowen, supra note 259, at 25. The French AOC system, moreover, “now serves as 
the basis for the European Union’s policies on Protected Denomination of Origins (PDO) and 
Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs).” Id. at 24.  
 262.  See, e.g., Sarah Bowen, Development from Within? The Potential for Geographical Indications 
in the Global South, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 231 (2010) (illustrating how influential market actors 
have manipulated the geographical indication standards for tequila against the interests of smaller 
producers and the environment); see also Cristina Grasseni, Developing Cheese at the Foot of the Alps, 
in REIMAGINING MARGINALIZED FOODS: GLOBAL PROCESSES, LOCAL PLACES 133 (Elizabeth 
Finnish ed., 2012). 
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collective action. For example, in 1999, the United States placed a sanction on 
European agricultural exports, including on the AOC-designated French 
Roquefort cheese, after the European Union refused to comply with a WTO 
decision requiring it to lift its ban on hormone-treated U.S. beef.263 In response, 
members of local sheep-milk associations, along with a powerful smallholders’ 
agricultural union, engaged in a widely publicized (although mostly symbolic) 
effort to dismantle a McDonald’s. Farmers painted the slogan: “McDo out, 
Roquefort in!”264 As one union member put it, “We tried to make it clear: it was 
industrialized agriculture against local artisanal agriculture.”265 
Terroir is thus a powerful cultural as well as legal concept that is “difficult to 
translate”266—although it often is translated by American legal practitioners as 
simply a kind of regional characteristic. As a regional characteristic, terroir 
becomes connected to geographical indications—place-based labels that, in the 
United States, are a form of intellectual property rights protected under the 
federal trademark system, and function simply “as brands, preserving 
reputation and truth in labeling.”267 The United States has also enacted federal 
legislation enabling geographical designations for wine production,268 but these 
can be owned by any individual or corporate entity without regards to “a 
cooperative system of governance or the specification of culturally-sensitive or 
environmentally-sustainable production methods.”269 In other words, in the 
United States, geographical indications are understood apart from scalar and 
social concerns such as artisanal standards of production, cooperative 
ownership, and democratic forms of governance and local control. 
Paxson reports that American artisanal cheese makers discuss terroir in 
ways that diverge both from American legal categories as well as from French 
cultural and geographical ones. Many American small cheese producers view as 
 
 263. Appellate Body Report, European Communities Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13 1998); see also 
Christopher Ansell & David Vogel, The Contested Governance of European Food Safety Regulation, in 
WHAT’S THE BEEF? THE CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 3 (Christopher 
Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006). 
 264.  See HELLER, supra note 137, at 187–97.  
 265.  Id. at 190 (quoting José Bové, a member of the Confédération Paysanne).  See also JOSÉ BOVÉ 
& FRANÇOIS DUFOUR, THE WORLD IS NOT FOR SALE: FARMERS AGAINST JUNK FOOD (2001).  
 266.  Amy B. Trubek et al., Produits du Terroir: Similarities and Differences Between France, 
Québec and Vermont 2 (Univ. of Vt., Food System Research Collaborative, Opportunities for 
Agriculture Working Paper Series vol. 1, no. 2). 
 267.  Laura Zanzig, The Perfect Pairing: Protecting U.S. Geographical Indications with a Sino-
American Wine Registry, 88 WASH. L. REV. 723, 725 (2013). The United States created geographical 
indications, and then treated them as a subset of trademark law, in order to comply with TRIPS 
Agreement requirements. See generally the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.299; 15 U.S.C. §1054 (1999). See also Ruth L. 
Okediji, The International Intellectual Property Roots of Geographical Indications, 82 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1329, 1333 (2007). Several scholars have criticized this conceptual collapse. See, e.g., Dev Gangjee, 
Quibbling Siblings: Conflicts Between Trademarks and Geographical Indications, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1253, 1267 (2007).  
 268.  27 C.F.R. §9.1 (establishing viticultural areas). 
 269.  Trubek & Bowen, supra note 259, at 29. 
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disingenuous a precise claim to regional distinctiveness that consumers can 
discern via taste.270 Unlike French practice, American artisanal cheese making 
often does not stretch back in particular regions over any length of time; 
instead, new entrepreneurs are trying to refabricate artisanal cheese practices 
suited to the land they have (what one calls “reverse-engineering terroir”).271 
These small producers certainly recognize the exchange value of terroir as an 
intangible marketable commodity; but “to many U.S. cheese makers, the notion 
is bankrupt if it is nothing but a label legitimating high retail prices.”272 For 
them, terroir does or should stand not only for exchange value but also for 
value-based civic ideals that include local stewardship, the transmission of 
artisanal know-how, and solidaristic forms of place-based development. As one 
cheese maker put it, “We’re working here with the concept of terroir, and that’s 
local grass.”273 Local grass, Paxson explains of this usage, means not only that 
the cheese will feature the flavors of animals fed on local pastures. Buying grass 
from community producers also means money that stays “‘in town.’”274 Another 
told Paxson: “I’m setting up a cheese guild,” where producers will share the 
costs for equipment and overhead but will have separate labels and businesses; 
“this little plant,” the cheese maker anticipated, “will be producing twenty-one 
hundred pounds of cheese a week but won’t be one sole proprietor getting 
bigger and bigger . . . . We will all be artisan.”275 Here terroir embodies a 
community of artisanal producers collaborating and competing but in ways 
designed to prevent the emergence of a permanently dominant one. Thus 
Paxson concludes that for American artisanal cheese makers, terroir is “a kind 
of place marketing, but one that . . . reflects a concerted effort to literally create 
the social and economic basis for claims of uniqueness” that producers may use 
to enlist consumers in expansive regional, national, even transnational networks 
of exchange.276 
Significantly, artisanal cheese makers do not enlist state law to implement 
alternative standards for production, property ownership, or economic 
development. As Paxson describes it, the state is not particularly relevant to 
their food politics.277 At least not beyond their resistance to a legal regime, 
designed around industrial dairies, that regulates raw milk as “a potential 
biohazard.”278 Federal regulations, for example, require cheese makers to age 
 
 270.  Paxson, supra note 238, at 449–50. 
 271.  Id. at 451–52. 
 272.  Id. at 449. 
 273.  Id. at 452. 
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Id. at 451. 
 276.  Id. at 452 (internal quotations omitted); id. at 453 (noting that “taste of place is not the same as 
taste of proximity”).  
 277.  Id. at 447.  
 278.  Paxson, supra note 239, at 16, 30–32. Paxson describes how cheese makers are creating 
alternative forms of social meaning and social relations generated against a “Pasteurian social order” 
established and maintained by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 
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raw-milk cheeses for at least sixty days and ban the sale of raw milk in interstate 
commerce for consumption.279 To be sure, activists have challenged raw-milk 
bans in court. But these efforts are typically articulated from the consumer 
perspective in the language of individual rights—for example, rights to privacy, 
travel, and choice. This is the case even for organizations, such as the Farm-to-
Consumer Legal Defense Fund, explicitly committed to the interests of 
artisanal food producers.280 
Of course, there are few alternative legal strategies to pursue: as Stephanie 
Tai recently observed, “existing legal avenues fail to mesh with the values of the 
sustainable food movement.”281 Nor can producers access any sort of legal–
administrative framework like the AOC that combines state-based advocacy for 
a community of producers with requirements for collaborative forms of 
production and control. Indeed, political scientist Jim Bingen describes recent 
unsuccessful efforts by food scholars and policy researchers to encourage the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture to transform geographic indications into 
strategies of rural development that promote democratic collective organization 
in the market and protection of smallholder interests by the state.282 
That said, concerns with small-scale production have begun cropping up in 
legislative debates about food safety.283 Most prominently, the 2010 Food Safety 
Modernization Act included an (extensively debated) amendment designed to 
ease safety restrictions for small farmers. The amendment was based on the 
claim, in the words of its cosponsor Senator Jon Tester, that “family growers 
have more ‘eyeballs to the acre.’”284 Like artisanal cheese makers, proponents of 
 
 279.  21 C.F.R. §§133.182, 1240.61 (2014). 
 280.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory, Preliminary and Other Injunctive Relief, Farm-
to-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-CV-04018, (N.D. Iowa Feb. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 
1868971 (challenging the federal ban on raw milk). See also generally DAVID E. GUMPERT, THE RAW 
MILK REVOLUTION: BEHIND AMERICAN’S EMERGING BATTLE OVER FOOD RIGHTS (2009); KEEP 
FOOD LEGAL, http://www.keepfoodlegal.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 281.  Stephanie Tai, The Rise of U.S. Food Sustainability Litigation, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1070 
(2012) (surveying recent anti-GMO and animal-welfare litigation). 
 282.  Jim Bingen, Labels of Origin for Food, the New Economy and Opportunities for Rural 
Development in the US, 29 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 543 (2012); Jim Bingen, People, Place and Politics: 
Notes for Re-Inventing Food in US Regions, paper presented at The Re-invention of Food, Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Studies, October 18–19 (2013). In his analysis of worker cooperatives, Simon 
puts the point in broader terms: “public efforts in the United States have been relatively insensitive to 
the possibilities of small-scale, locally-rooted, human-capital-intensive enterprise.” Simon, supra note 
153, at 1402.  
 283.  I should add that democratic experimentalists here speak subtly in the language of law and 
context. For example, Sabel and Simon have suggested that new legal regimes governing food safety—
negotiated via broad-based stakeholder participation—can better contextualize risk based on 
qualitative distinctions among producers and thus achieve more rational regulatory standards. Charles 
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits 
of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1282 (2012) (describing the 
California Leafy Greens Products Handler Marketing Agreement and criticisms calling “for further 
contextualization, especially to accommodate small farmers”). 
 284.  Helena Bottemiller, Tester: Small Farmers Won with Food Safety Exemptions, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS, May 5, 2011. For key provisions of the amendment, see 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f)(1) (2012). But see 
Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers Facing Producers of 
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the amendment deployed “scale-sensitive” arguments about risk and safety in 
order to advocate for a broader set of ideals about local economic development 
and democracy.285 Tester himself made some of these broader arguments 
explicit: “We deal with consolidation in our energy sector . . . in our banking 
sector, and we have consolidation in our food industry, too. The fact is that we 
need to not encourage that consolidation . . . . My amendment protects the 
ability for farmers’ markets to flourish . . . .”286 As my final brief example 
suggests, similar ideals have motivated the localization of fair trade—with 
perhaps more transparent efforts to recruit local lawmaking power. 
B. Fair Trade and Fair Trade Towns 
In the United States, fair trade is a billion-dollar retail business, but one 
marked by deep fissures around questions of size and scale, especially the 
organization of agricultural production.287 In October 2011, Fair Trade USA 
split from the Fair Trade Labeling Organization International, an umbrella 
organization that unites domestic certification organizations under a uniform 
label.288 Not unlike the French AOC regime, Fair Trade International certifies 
only coffee that is grown on farmer-owned cooperatives with democratic 
principles of self-governance.289 Certified cooperatives receive a minimum price 
for their crop and a premium based on a percentage of sales for social and 
economic development. Currently there are 360 certified cooperatives that 
produce more coffee than they can currently sell to fair trade buyers (suggesting 
there is no problem with undersupply).290 
 
“Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 49, 91–97 (2012) (noting the lack of empirical evidence 
behind the “local food is safer” proposition). 
 285.  See, e.g., Food Safety Action Alert, NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE COALITION, 
(Nov. 10, 2010), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/food-safety-action-alert-2/; see also Critical Food 
Safety Vote on November 17, FOOD DEMOCRACY NOW! (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.fooddemocracynow.org/blog/2010/nov/16/urgent-critical-food-safety-vote-nov-17th/. 
 286.  FDA Food Safety Modernization Act—Motion to Proceed, Congressional Record-Senate, 
November 18, 2010 at 38010. A similar set of scalar issues motivated 2013 revisions to Vermont’s 
Agricultural Housekeeping Bill to permit on-farm slaughter of a small number of animals for sale to 
consumers. See, e.g., Farm Fresh Meat, RURAL VERMONT, http://www.ruralvermont.org/issues-
main/ffmeat/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). See also Allison Condra, Food Sovereignty in the United States: 
Supporting Local and Regional Food Systems, 8 J. FOOD L. POL’Y 281, 304 (2012) (describing the Local 
Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of Sedgwick, Maine declaring “the right to produce, 
process, sell, purchase and consume local foods thus promoting self-reliance, the preservation of family 
farms, and local food traditions”). 
 287.  In 2009, Fair Trade USA estimated its retail sales at $1.2 billion. Fair Trade Up, Charitable 
Giving Down, FAIR TRADE USA (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://fairtradeusa.org/press-
room/press_release/fair-trade-charitable-giving-down. 
 288.  Scott Sherman, The Brawl Over Fair Trade Coffee, THE NATION, Aug. 22, 2012. 
 289.  See FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL, FAIRTRADE STANDARDS FOR SMALL PRODUCER 
ORGANIZATIONS, VERSION 1.05.2011_V.1.1 30 (2011), available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2012-07-11_SPO_EN.pdf. Fair Trade International 
restricts four commodities—coffee, cocoa, honey, and cotton—to smallholder cooperatives. See Daniel 
Jaffee, Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation, and Social Movement Responses in the United 
States, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 267, 277 (2010).  
 290.  Sherman, supra note 288, at 2. 
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Fair Trade USA, however, decided to certify coffee produced by waged 
farm workers on large plantations and by individual farmers, a decision widely 
perceived as an effort to appeal to the large-scale sourcing preferences of large 
corporations.291 For many activists, this decision undercut the defining feature of 
fair trade—namely, to enable smallholder cooperatives to compete for market 
access. As Eric Holt-Giménez, Ian Bailey, and Devon Sampson have argued, 
fair trade means helping small farmers “grow not just their market, but their 
market power; not just their businesses, but their controlling share within the 
business.”292 
This debate suggests broader tensions within contemporary economic 
development. In certifying plantation labor, Fair Trade USA promises vastly to 
expand the fair trade retail market and thus to advance the interests of the poor 
through principles of modest redistribution.293 Most significantly, it guarantees 
agricultural laborers on certified plantations a “right” to earn their national 
minimum wage—albeit a right that operates through voluntary participation in 
the market rather than through the coercion of nation-states.294 By contrast, 
activist opponents of Fair Trade USA’s decision privilege democratic 
smallholder cooperatives as an independent socioeconomic good. For example, 
Equal Exchange, the oldest fair trade coffee distributor in the United States, 
demands that the fair trade certification system protect cooperatives from large-
scale corporate competition (even from competition by plantations “that 
sincerely do right by their workers”).295 To that end, they have lobbied the 
 
 291.  See Sherman, supra note 288; Jaffee, supra note 289, at 277–78. For critiques of fair trade 
standards and policies designed in the interests of large corporations see Jaffee, supra note 289; Daniel 
Jaffee & Philip H. Howard, Corporate Cooptation of Organic and Fair Trade Standards, 27 AGRIC. 
HUM. VALUES 387 (2010). 
 292.  Eric Holt-Giménez, Ian Bailey & Devon Sampson, Fair Trade to the Last Drop: The Corporate 
Challenges to Fair Trade Coffee, 24 LEISA MAGAZINE 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.agriculturesnetwork.org/magazines/global/towards-fairer-trade/fair-to-the-last-drop-
corporate-challenges-to. See also Darryl Reed, What Do Corporations Have to Do with Fair Trade? 
Positive and Normative Analysis from a Value Chain Perspective, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 3 (2009) (discussing 
how plantation certification stands to squeeze out small producers); A. Tucker, Fair Enough?, THE 
NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Nov. 2006. 
 293.  Paul Rice, Fair Trade USA: Why We Parted Ways with Fair Trade International, 
TRIPLEPUNDIT (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/01/fair-trade-all-fair-trade-usa-plans-
double-impact-2015/. 
 294.  Fairtrade USA’s standards for plantation certification are currently under construction. Fair 
Trade Standards, FAIRTRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/certification/standards (last visited Feb. 17, 
2015). But they will likely approximate Fairtrade International’s standards, which require payment of a 
national minimum wage, the right to unionize, minimum safety conditions, and price premiums for a 
local development fund. FAIR TRADE STANDARD FOR HIRED LABOR, FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 
(2014), available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/ 
generic-standards/2014-1-15_HL_EN_FINAL.pdf. 
 295.  Why Is Equal Exchange For Co-Ops And Against Plantations In The Fair Trade System?, 
EQUAL EXCHANGE, http://www.equalexchange.coop/about/fair-trade/faqs/why-equal-exchange-co-
ops-and-against-plantations-fair-trade-system (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). Fair trade activists against 
plantation certification are not indifferent to plight of agricultural laborers. To the contrary, many 
criticize standards based on a minimum rather than a living wage and the right to unionize rather than 
union representation. Jaffee, supra note 289, at 276. But see Sandy Brown & Christy Getz, Towards 
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largest American retailer of fair trade coffee to exit the Fair Trade USA 
system.296 They have also helped launch an alternative label—the Small 
Producers Symbol (SPP)—and have encouraged processers and retailers to 
participate in strengthening and expanding this cooperative agricultural 
model.297 
This is not a simple debate. As anthropologist Sarah Lyon argues, “fair 
trade’s single most important limitation is its small market size.”298 For that 
reason, Fair Trade USA has formally adopted a scale-agnostic view on 
certification: for the sake of expanding its share of the retail coffee market, Fair 
Trade USA includes actors of various size and social organization provided that 
they meet a minimum set of social welfare requirements. But this scale-agnostic 
view also recalls the neoliberal position: if large actors consequently crowd out 
smaller ones, that is of secondary significance. By contrast, Equal Exchange 
explicitly privileges small-scale and decentralized workplaces as a necessary 
(albeit not sufficient) means of creating democracy and justice in economic life. 
Neither side has tried to engage state lawmaking processes in support of its 
scalar fair trade vision. But it seems clear that Equal Exchange’s rather 
Brandeisian commitments would be far more challenging to mobilize in 
contemporary legal form than would be a proposal to use the market to expand 
social entitlements to individual agricultural workers. 
Lyon explores how fair trade activists have nonetheless begun to engage 
local lawmaking bodies. These activists, critical “of the movement’s co-optation 
by large-scale corporate interests,” have turned away from an exclusive focus on 
producer communities in developing economies and towards what J.K. Gibson-
Graham calls a “global politics of local transformations.”299 They aim to enlist 
local governments in designating particular American communities as “fair 
trade towns” in order to cultivate alternative economic practices in the places 
“where they themselves live.”300 
To that end, the fair trade town movement lobbies local governments to 
enact rules like this Buy Local/Buy Fair ordinance passed in 2008 by the city of 
Northampton: 
The City of Northampton hereby establishes a Buy Local/Buy Fair policy to maximize 
purchase of locally produced, Fair Trade Certified, and/or fairly traded products from 
locally owned businesses in the process of procuring necessary goods for municipal 
 
Domestic Fair Trade? Farm Labor, Food Localism, and the ‘Family Scale’ Farm, 73 GEOJOURNAL 11 
(2008) (arguing that privileging “family scale” farms in fair trade policy may obscure the needs of 
agricultural laborers).  
 296.  See, e.g., An Open Letter to Green Mountain Coffee Roasters from Equal Exchange: Please 
Leave Fair Trade USA (May 20, 2012), available at http://equalexchange.coop/open-letter-green-
mountain-coffee-roasters-equal-exchange. 
 297.  See SMALL FARMERS. BIG CHANGE, http://smallfarmersbigchange.coop (last visited Feb. 17, 
2015). 
 298.  Sarah Lyon, Fair Trade Towns USA: Growing the Market within a Diverse Economy, 21 J. 
POL. ECOLOGY 145, 148 (2014). 
 299.  Id. at 149. 
 300.  Id.  
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operations . . . ; and 
As authorized under MGL Ch. 30B, Section 20, the City of Northampton hereby 
establishes a preference for products of agriculture grown or produced using products 
grown in the Commonwealth. . . .301 
There are currently thirty-two fair trade towns (and sixty-nine campaigns in 
progress),302 often with uneasy relationships to Fair Trade USA.303 I have not 
discovered ordinances that reject the Fair Trade USA label. But activists now 
confront a different set of scalar questions. They must debate what localism 
means as a legal category of town and city governance. Is it a proximate 
geographical space or an aspiration for alternative forms of capitalist global 
exchange?304 One city official in Northampton proposed to blur the distinction: 
“the buy local, buy fair message is a very inclusive message: to embrace local 
farmers but also to embrace small farmers around the world.”305 Another fair 
trade town campaign in Vermont set clearer proximate priorities: “Buy local 
and when you can’t buy local buy fair.”306 The point I wish to stress, however, is 
that fair trade towns represent an explicit attempt to enlist legal power in the 
politics of relocalization (with all of its complexities and inequalities). But even 
here there is ambivalence and debate. Lyon reports that campaign leaders have 
proposed to recognize fair trade towns without formal legislative enactment.307 
In 1989, Friedmann and McMichael concluded their history of food regimes 
by predicting that if renationalization was the protective movement of the past, 
“relocalization combined with global co-ordination may be the protective 
movement of our times.”308 My examples are microillustrations of this point—
smallholder artisanal cheese production and fair trade towns represent a 
response to the mass industrialization of food that combine efforts to localize 
production and market exchange with value-based commitments that link these 
locations to communities of producers and consumers in many other spaces. 
But, compared to renationalization, these processes of relocalization engage far 
less with state law. 
As we have seen, the renationalization of food happened during the social 
period. There, elite reformers actively recruited law to debate the organization 
of the economy along scalar and corporatist lines. The organization that 
prevailed—large-scale national industrialization—was made possible by a legal 
logic of social development that empowered planners confidently to assert that 
 
 301.  City of Northampton, Buy Local/Buy Fair Resolution, (Apr. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.northamptonma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/872. 
 302.  Fair Trade Towns, FAIR TRADE CAMPAIGNS, http://fairtradecampaigns.org/campaign-
type/towns/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). The first fair trade town was established in 2005. 
 303.  Lyon, supra note 298, at 153.  
 304.  Id. See also Bowen & Mutersbaugh, supra note 259.  
 305.  Lyon, supra note 298, at 155.  
 306.  Id. (describing the rhetorical strategy of the campaign). See also Derrick Braaten & Marne 
Coit, Legal Issues in Local Food Systems, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 9, 26, 29–31 (2010) (noting the rise of 
local agricultural sourcing requirements over the past five years). 
 307.  Lyon, supra note 298, at 150 n.7.  
 308.  Friedmann & McMichael, supra note 2, at 114. 
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they were using law to advance a single, desirable social end. National processes 
of industrialization, in turn, produced multinational food corporations with 
interests that did not necessarily overlap with the interests of states (or citizens). 
Here, again, law mattered a great deal. The contemporary revival of classical 
legal thought in the market helped to naturalize the power of multinational 
corporations with its commitment to the formal equality of all market actors 
constrained in their ability to expand only by a particular calculation of 
efficiency. 
Against this configuration of corporate power, actors today are reimagining 
more spatialized and scale-sensitive markets within our global capitalist food 
economy.309 Fair trade coffee activists like Equal Exchange are reviving debates 
about whether size and scale are legitimate categories to articulate a social and 
economic, if not yet legal, vision of the good. To that end, they share with 
artisanal cheese makers the idea that social and economic policy should be 
concerned not only with growth, or even distribution, but also with the political-
economic and scalar conditions that enable people to exercise a meaningful 
amount of democratic control over the conditions of their lives.310 In both cases, 
we have seen early and experimental attempts to embed such processes of 
relocalization within practices of state power (such as the Food Safety 
Modernization Act Amendment and fair trade town ordinances). But the actors 
I described express their commitments to cooperative forms of smallholder 
production primarily in the language of mutual aid, voluntary exchange, and 
movement-based politics, and are only just beginning to consider whether and 
how to influence the institutions of contemporary law. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
This article on contemporary legal thought weaves together several different 
temporal and conceptual threads. I began by redescribing influential 
metanarratives of law and food in order to illustrate how law shapes food 
systems and facilitates their transformation. I argued that by reading food 
regimes through Kennedy’s three periods of legal thought, we can see how ideas 
of scale and size have functioned as legal arguments about the desirability of 
different kinds of market relations—arguments that have stood for a range of 
values including class-based activism, democratic forms of economic self-
governance, and cooperative and decommodified forms of economic production 
and that have been more or less compelling at different moments in time. 
 
 309.  My examples are not efforts to upend capitalist global food systems but rather to create 
“alternative economic spaces . . . [and] operational logics” within them. DAVID GOODMAN, E. 
MELANIE DUPUIS & MICHAEL K. GOODMAN, ALTERNATIVE FOOD NETWORKS: KNOWLEDGE, 
PRACTICE, AND POLITICS 9 (2012). 
 310.  There is some parallel here to the communitarian ideal of economic citizenship advanced by 
Michael Sandel. See MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1998) (especially ch. 8: “Liberalism and the Keynesian Revolution”).  
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I then turned to the present and observed that there is growing interest 
among contemporary American legal scholars in the practices, techniques, and 
theories of decentralization. But this interest, I argued, enlists institutions not of 
the market but of the state. As a telling example, I described democratic 
experimentalism. Whereas contemporary food scholars have revived Sabel’s 
critiques of mass industrial production to argue for alternative forms of 
smallholder agricultural production and exchange,311 among legal scholars, 
democratic experimentalism stands primarily for public sector reform. I thus 
suggested that a robust debate about democratizing markets is missing among 
progressive decentralists in law. 
In the final part, I examined efforts to create alternative forms of capitalism 
that take seriously restrictions on the scalar conditions of production and 
exchange. In my two examples—artisanal raw-milk cheese production and fair 
trade towns—attention to size and scale gives rise to normative arguments, ones 
that are infused with particular solidaristic and ethically based values. It is not 
itself a legal consciousness in Kennedy’s terms—that is, attention to size and 
scale is not a way “of conceiving of the legal organization of society” that is the 
common property of the left and the right and in which an infinite variety of 
regulatory and justificatory arguments are expressed.312 Rather, in my examples 
invocations of the local and the small represent ways in which ordinary people, 
living under late neoliberal conditions, are trying to create more ethical and 
democratic forms of market exchange that include market access for a 
multiplicity of producers. As such, alternative food movements are tapping into 
a broader popular consciousness, one that Mark Tushnet suggests that 
Americans today experience mostly as “discontent”—namely, the idea that “the 
concentration of economic power in transnational corporations . . . deprives 
United States citizens of important powers of self-governance.”313 
I want to conclude nonetheless by emphasizing that there is of course 
nothing intrinsically emancipatory about the local and the small. To the 
contrary, scalar construction is always politically complex. It is capable of 
reproducing as much as challenging existing inequalities and hierarchies as 
social and geographical boundaries are defined to include and exclude various 
actors and spaces on the ground.314 In Julie Guthman’s words: “eating local, 
organic, seasonal food that you prepared yourself may be pleasurable but it is 
 
 311.  I should add: an important literature emphasizes the limits of industrial–agricultural 
comparisons (because of the unique features of food production and food markets) but its arguments 
are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., David Goodman & Michael Watts, Reconfiguring the 
Rural or Fording the Divide, 22 J. PEASANT STUD. 1 (1994); Ben Fine, Towards a Political Economy of 
Food, 1 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 519, 533–38 (1994).  
 312.  Kennedy, supra note 1, at 22–23, 63.  
 313.  Mark Tushnet, A Public Philosophy for the Professional-Managerial Class, 106 YALE L.J. 
1571, 1571 (1997). 
 314.  See, e.g., E. Melanie DuPuis & David Goodman, Should We Go “Home” To Eat?: Toward a 
Reflexive Politics of Localism, 21 J. RURAL STUD. 359 (2005).  
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not universally so, nor is it tantamount to effecting social justice.”315 Indeed, her 
own critical history of the organic movement in the United States includes 
analysis of how its commitments to size (privileging small versus large farms) 
became a commitment to form rather than to the “processes of social and 
ecological exploitation that gave rise to the organic critique in the first place.”316 
Nor is there anything intrinsically emancipatory about a state that prioritizes 
the interests of a multiplicity of producers—as James Whitman has shown such 
producerist systems have overlapped with a range of (socialist to fascist) 
political values.317 
I have used the analytical categories of size and scale as a theme throughout 
this article to make a more limited and descriptive point. Namely, to make 
visible the ways in which contemporary resistance to concentration in food 
markets has mobilized older ideas of smallness and bigness as normative 
categories of food production and distribution—ideas now stretched over 
changing contemporary configurations of (conceptual and territorial) local and 
global space. It is far from clear whether and how this resistance will succeed in 
democratizing power and, if so, with what distributional effects (on, for 
example, labor, class, gender, and family relations). But it is precisely for this 
reason that contemporary food activism presents an opportunity to reconstruct 
a left-legal analytics of size and scale. And perhaps, beyond an analytics, a set of 
political arguments about economic self-governance that can be cultivated from 
within the contradictory and unsynthesized tools of contemporary legal 
thought. 
 
 
 315.  GUTHMAN, supra note 230, at 5. See also SUSANNE FREIDBERG, FRESH: A PERISHABLE 
HISTORY (2009). 
 316.  GUTHMAN, supra note 228, at 12, 174–76. 
 317.  Whitman, supra note 198, at 357–60. 
